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Abstract
Pervasive computing enables a new paradigm that integrates digital and physical entities into a unified
programmable system. Physical entities such as electrical appliances can be augmented with sensors and
actuators that interact with digital devices to facilitate remote interactions and control. These entities have
spatial-awareness of their environments, which enables several new applications and services.
Numerous prototype pervasive systems have been successfully built and deployed in various controlled
environments such as classrooms and computing labs. Lately, there has been some interest in commercial
deployment of these systems in offices, health care, laboratories and assisted-living facilities. When they
are deployed in commercial organizations they need to follow the guidelines set by the organization. These
guidelines dictate quality-of-service guarantees that should be provided to users, stipulate hours of operations
of the system, specify system configuration that should always be maintained, constrain application behavior
and mandate service offerings.
Policy-based management is an approach in which organization guidelines can be expressed as policies
that are enforced by a management system. These rules specify the corrective actions that should be executed
in different situations and are designed using the Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rule framework. The events
and conditions express the situation in which the corrective action should be executed.
A management policy evolves over time by addition and removal of rules, policy composition, rule
modifications and due to various system dynamisms. These changes may result in conflicts and cycles
among rules. Multiple rules can become simultaneously eligible for enforcement in a situation and the order
of enforcement may determine the final system state. Rule enforcement may fail necessitating an exception
model for policies. Rules may contain long-running actions, which may cause conflicts with rules that are
enforced at a later situation. The dynamism of pervasive systems with frequently changing configurations
further complicates policy design. In order to address these issues, complex static and dynamic reasoning
techniques have to be supported by management systems. The ECA rule framework is poorly suited for
designing management policies for pervasive systems since it does not contain any information about the
rule action. A rule action is initiated on the specified situation and there is no information about the effect
iii
of the action on the system or whether the action completed execution successfully. This information is
vital for policy analysis and for providing various guarantees. The above problems lead to non-determinism,
which makes the management process unpredictable.
In this thesis, we propose a rule framework called Event-Condition-Precondition-Action-Postcondition
(ECPAP) that contains axiomatic specifications of rule actions, for designing management policies. These
specifications formally state the effect of an action using Hoare logic as pre- and post-conditions. This
framework facilitates advanced conflict and cycle analysis, determines enforcement order when multiple
rules are simultaneously triggered, supports policy exception handling and provides reasoning support for
rules with long-running actions. We show how the ECPAP framework enables deterministic policy-based
management.
The mobility of devices and applications in a pervasive system complicates policy design. Rules have to
be added or revoked when the composition of a system changes. Therefore, we propose an extension to the
ECPAP framework based on roles. This approach simplifies policy management in pervasive systems.
We propose algorithms for static and dynamic analyses, enforcement verification and monitoring and
reasoning with long-running actions. We demonstrate the need for these algorithms on various distributed
and pervasive systems and evaluate their performance. Our experiments show that the ECPAP framework
leads to effective policy-based management and is a feasible approach.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Technological advances, over the last decade, in computing, communications and devices have ushered in
an era where large numbers of heterogeneous mobile and immobile devices can be combined to form a
programmable system. These systems, called pervasive systems, blend digital and physical infrastructures
and enable “smart” homes, “aware” offices [KOA+99], sentient spaces [ACH+01] and other responsive envi-
ronments [PJKF03, RHC+02]. The goal of pervasive computing is to create a programmable system from
everyday digital and physical devices such as desktop computers, handheld devices, sensors, actuators and
electrical appliances. These systems create infrastructures that simplify usage of such devices and facilitate
remote interactions with them. These systems can be used in offices, classrooms, laboratories and various
other venues to aid users in performing everyday tasks.
The vision of pervasive computing is to create a user-centric non-intrusive system that aids the user with
little or no distraction [Wei94]. Users should spend more time using the system than configuring it. Pervasive
systems consist of diverse computing and communication devices. These devices communicate through a
myriad of technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Infrared, wired networks and so on. This multitude of
technologies necessitates a software infrastructure that integrates these devices with minimal intervention.
The infrastructure should also manage the lifetime of this device-ensemble and provide services that unify
the resources of various entities of the system. Middleware-based technologies have been very successful
in enabling a pervasive computing system. Several research projects have developed prototype pervasive
systems and deployed them in various controlled environments such as classrooms [Abo99], laboratories
[GDL+04] and homes [KOA+99].
The Gaia project [RHC+02] takes an operating system approach to create a pervasive system, called
Active Spaces, by identifying and separating essential pervasive services from applications. An active space
is a physically-bounded collection of devices, applications and services [RSC04]. Typical examples of active
spaces include “smart” rooms, interactive meeting rooms and collaborative classrooms. The active space
operating system has a services layer containing various services for discovery, naming, eventing and location-
awareness that can be used by any application running in the active space. These services provide support
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for discovering new devices and services, integrating services of mobile devices with that of the active space,
migrating applications and data across devices and for various other functionalities.
The success of many pervasive system architectures has encouraged their deployments in many com-
mercial settings. Aware-home systems have been deployed in homes [KOA+99], IBM Everywhere display
systems have been deployed in shopping malls [PPK+03] and Ubisense location systems have been deployed
in offices [SG05]. When pervasive systems are deployed in commercial organizations, they need to follow the
guidelines set by the organizations. Organizations may stipulate hours of operation of the system, the qual-
ity of service to be provided to different users, protocols for authorization, policies for data and application
management and so on.
Traditionally, organization guidelines are expressed as administrative tasks that are enforced by system
scripts. These scripts are executed on timers, signals or other notifications. For example, data backup on
servers every night is a good example of a timer-based administrative task. Initiating virus checking when a
virus signature is detected in an executable file is an example of a notification-based task. These management
activities are typically designed in an ad-hoc manner by various administrators. Each administrator designs
management scripts for specific aspects of the system such as file systems, memory, process and so on. As
a result, scripts may conflict with each other; they may fail and leave the system in an undesired state
or their concurrent executions may adversely affect the functioning of various applications on the system.
Script-based management systems provide no means for reasoning about concurrent administrative activities.
Policy-based management provides a framework for specification and reasoning about concurrent man-
agement activities and is a natural extension of script-based management. Many system-administration
activities can be viewed as reactions to system situations by execution of corrective actions. For example,
initiation of virus checking process on a system is a reaction to a virus − sense situation. Policy-based
management systems view administrative tasks as sets of situation-action pairs that are specified as rules.
System administrators encode organization guidelines as sets of rules, called policies, and these policies are
enforced by a management system. Rules can be analyzed to determine conflicts, cycles and various other
undesired behaviors.
Most management policy rules are designed using the Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rule framework
[LBN99, SRC05, Slo94]. This framework enables specification of situations as Event-Conditions. When an
event occurs, the management system enforcing the policy rules receives the event and determines which
rules in the policy needs to be enforced. It verifies if the conditions of those rules are satisfied and if so,
executes the associated action. A typical ECA rule is shown below:
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on(NodeFail(Node n))
if(n.type == “computeNode”)
do(startnewFailOverNode());
This rule is enforced when a NodeFail event is observed and if the failed node is of type computeNode.
The action of the rule starts a new failover node from a pool of nodes.
A management policy consists of several ECA rules. Two or more rules may be based on the same
event-conditions and therefore, can get triggered on the same situation. These rules may conflict with each
other confusing the management system. Action of a rule may trigger another rule, whose action may trigger
the first rule through a chain of rules causing a non-terminating cycle of rule enforcements. Even when rules
do not conflict, order of enforcement of multiple rules may determine the final system state. Typically,
when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered, existing policy systems enforce rules in a random order.
Therefore, no guarantees are provided regarding the final system state. Rule actions may fail and leave
the managed system in an invalid state. Rules can have long-running actions that can cause problems with
rules that are triggered on events in a future situation. These issues result in non-deterministic system
management.
In this thesis, we argue that existing ECA rule framework is poorly suited to address the above problems
and should be extended with formal specifications of actions. We propose a new rule framework called Event-
Condition-Precondition-Action-Postcondition (ECPAP) for designing management rules. This framework
combines axiomatic specifications of actions with management rules and enables complex static and dynamic
reasoning. We show how the ECPAP framework can be used for conflict analysis, cycle detection, determining
enforcement order when multiple rules are triggered, designing exception models for policies and for reasoning
about rules with long-running actions. We formally prove that the ECPAP framework enables deterministic
policy-based management.
1.1 Problem
In this section, we detail the problem that was briefly discussed in the last section. Most policy-based
management systems use the event-condition-action framework for rule specification. Application of the
framework to design active space policies leads to numerous problems. Though the problems are not specific
to active spaces, the dynamism and heterogeneity of an active space exacerbates them. Some of these prob-
lems have been noticed in policies designed for other distributed systems such as Grids and computational
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clusters.
Policy Rule Conflicts
A rule conflict occurs when two or more rules may need to be simultaneously enforced in the system
but their actions conflict with each other. Typical examples of conflicting rules include rules with actions to
turn on and off a device, to increase and decrease service quality simultaneously, to migrate a process to a
device while simultaneously stopping the process and so on. These conflicts can be detected by the action
constraint model [CLN00] that captures conflicting actions as a conjunction of predicates. The set of actions
that are in conflict are stated explicitly by the system administrator. If two or more rules with those actions
are triggered, the system detects a conflict.
While this model can detect conflicting actions that are stated explicitly, the model fails to detect con-
flicts due to side-effects of actions. For example, a rule that migrates a process to a target device conflicts
with a rule that shuts down the device, since a device thats not running cannot host the migrated process.
Similarly, a rule that starts an application conflicts with a rule that hibernates the host device. These con-
flicts are not normally identified by an administrator and therefore, are not explicitly specified. Rather, they
occur due to side-effects of the original rule actions. In the first example, the inability of the stopped device
to receive a migrating process is a side-effect of the shutdown process. In order to detect such conflicts, the
effects of the actions on the system should be stated explicitly.
Policy Cycles
Policies may have a set of rules that trigger each other continuously in sequence. Action of a rule may
generate events that trigger another rule whose action may trigger the first rule through a sequence of zero
or more intermediate rules. This leads to a non-terminating sequence of rule enforcements causing a policy
cycle. Though some cycles may lead to desired system behavior, most cycles may not, as they cause oscil-
lations in system states. Therefore, cycles should be detected and reported to the policy designer. In order
to detect cycles, the set of events generated by an action execution must be known. The ECA framework
contains no such information and therefore, provides no means to detect policy cycles.
Rule Enforcement Order
In certain situations, multiple non-conflicting rules may need to be enforced and the order of enforcement
of these rules can determine the final system state. For example, in our active space system, when a device
is brought into the space, the location system generates an ObjectEnter event that triggers two rules. The
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first rule authenticates the device with the space and the second rule mounts the device file system onto
the active space file system. The mounting operation succeeds only after the device has authenticated itself
with the space. If the first rule is enforced before the second rule, the file system is successfully mounted.
But if the enforcement order is reversed the mounting operation fails. Therefore, the policy system should
define semantics of enforcement when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered. Existing policy-based
management systems do not reason about concurrent rule enforcements and define no enforcement ordering.
Policy Exceptions
Actions of rules may fail due to policy errors, wrong parameters or various other system conditions.
Existing policy-based systems do not verify action execution and assume that rule enforcement was successful.
The success of rule enforcement should be verified and corrective actions should be taken on rule failure.
A policy defines an abstraction level by capturing situation-action pairs as rules. Errors in policy en-
forcement should be addressed at this abstraction level by the policy designer and therefore, an exception
model for policies is required. For example, if a rule to migrate an application to a target device fails, there
should be mechanisms in the policy system to detect the situation and handle the failure.
Long-running Actions
Some rules may contain actions that persist through out the running time of the system or for significantly
long periods of time such that they interfere with rules that are enforced in future situations. Such rules
include rules that initiate heartbeat messages on devices for fault detection, force entities to be in certain
states and maintain certain QoS. When these rules are enforced, the actions of these rules can cause conflicts
with rules that are triggered on a different event in future. For example, a rule that initiates heartbeats
on a device conflicts with a rule that turns off the device in a future situation since a device cannot send
out heartbeats in the off state. In order to detect such conflicts formal specification of action behavior is
required and therefore, the ECA framework is poorly suited.
Rules with long-running actions may need to be monitored through out their enforcement duration. In
our active space, heartbeat messages are sent by devices periodically to indicate device membership. If heart-
beat messages stop, the device is considered to be no longer part of the active space. When the messages
stop, the rule that initiated the heartbeats should be considered to have failed and corrective actions should
be taken. Therefore, rules with long-running actions should be monitored throughout their enforcement
duration.
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Complexity of policy design due to active space dynamism
An active space is a dynamic system with devices entering and exiting the space, applications migrating
across devices and system configuration changing frequently. This complicates policy maintenance since rules
should be added and removed quite frequently. Each time a policy is modified, it has to be analyzed for
conflicts and cycles. When devices exit a space, rules should be removed to avoid unnecessary enforcement
failures due to absence of devices. These issues cause significant overhead to manage policies.
1.2 Approach
In order to address the above problems, rules require information about the effects of actions. The ECA
framework does not contain any such information and therefore, fails to address the above problems. In this
thesis, we propose an extended version of ECA framework, called Event-Condition-Precondition-Action-
Postcondition (ECPAP) for designing policy rules. This framework combines axiomatic and behavioral
specifications of actions with ECA rules as pre- and post-conditions. The pre-condition represents the state
the system should be in before the action can be executed and the post-condition represents the system
state once the action successfully completes execution.
The extra knowledge about action effects provided by the ECPAP framework enables analyzing conflicts
due to side-effects of actions. The post-conditions of actions describe the effect of the action on the system
and therefore, the system can analyze if two actions lead to conflicting post-conditions.
The post-condition of an action contains the set of events that are generated during action execution.
This information enables the system to determine if there is a set of rules that trigger each other in a cycle.
This facilitates policy analysis to determine termination of rule enforcement.
When multiple rules are simultaneously triggered, the action specifications can be used to build a de-
pendency graph of triggered rule actions. Rules are enforced based on dependencies. This enables the
management system to determine dependent and confluent rules and provide enforcement guarantees.
The post-condition of an action can be used to determine if a rule action successfully executed. If the
post-condition is not satisfied, the rule is assumed to have failed and corrective actions can be taken. This
facilitates an exception model for policies, which was unavailable with the ECA framework.
The post-conditions can also contain behavioral specification of long-running actions in temporal logic.
These specifications facilitate reasoning about long-running action conflicts and monitoring their execution.
Finally, the ECPAP framework can be combined with role-based management approaches to simplify
policy design for active spaces. Policy rules are designed with roles and an entity, such as a device or an
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application, that is assigned to a role should enforce the rule associated with the role. This simplifies policy
design and analysis in a dynamic system such as active spaces.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
This research work has developed and implemented the proposed framework and demonstrated its applica-
bility and usefulness in active spaces and two other distributed systems. The specific contributions of this
thesis are listed below:
Specification-enhanced rule framework: This framework combines action specifications with ECA
rules. Action specifications can contain system states, generated events and some behavioral information.
Static and dynamic policy analysis techniques: This thesis has developed various analysis tech-
niques for conflict analysis, termination detection and dependency analysis. These techniques enable the
system to provide better enforcement guarantees.
Definition of enforcement semantics for policies: This thesis also introduces the notion of en-
forcement semantics, which defines the order of enforcement of rules when multiple non-conflicting rules are
simultaneously triggered.
Exception model for policies: This thesis presents an exception model for policies. The model can
be used to detect rule enforcement failures and take corrective actions.
Support for rules with long-running actions: The thesis shows how the ECPAP framework can
be used to analyze rules with long-running actions. This approach uses state models to store system states
such as heartbeats and entity states.
Role-based management framework: The thesis demonstrates how role-based approaches to design-
ing policies can reduce the complexity of managing policies in dynamic environments such as active spaces.
It introduces role-based management models similar to RBAC [SCFY96] and introduces analysis techniques
for policies with roles.
Deterministic policy-based management: The ECPAP framework enables deterministic policy-
based management. This thesis presents a formal proof of determinism.
Implementation and evaluation: Finally, the thesis provides implementation and evaluation details
of the framework in our active space pervasive system. It also describes our experiences in managing the
Ganglia monitoring system [MCC] on PlanetLab clusters [PCAR02] and designing management policies for
a cluster file server using the new framework.
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1.4 Roadmap
In chapter 2, we discuss policy-based approaches to system management and introduce the active spaces
pervasive system. We present the problem addressed in this thesis in detail in chapter 3 and discuss our
approach. Chapter 4 presents the ECPAP framework with a discussion on the policy enforcement process.
Chapter 5 details conflict and cycle analyses using the ECPAP framework. We describe the problem of rule
ordering in chapter 6 and present our solution. Chapter 7 demonstrates the ability of the ECPAP framework
to support long-running actions. We present our enforcement monitoring techniques and exception handling
model for policies in chapter 8. We formally prove that the ECPAP framework enables deterministic man-
agement in chapter 9. We extend the ECPAP framework with roles and show how it simplifies policy design
and management in dynamic environments in chapter 10. We describe the architecture and implementation
details of our system and present case studies on using the system on two other distributed systems in
chapter 11. We compare our work to other research efforts on policies in chapter 12 and present possible
extensions to our work in chapter 13. We finally conclude in chapter 14 with a brief summary of our work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we set the stage to explain this research work by describing policy-based approach to systems
management and our active spaces pervasive system, which was used as a test bed system to validate the
results of this work. In section 2.1, we discuss policy-based management of systems with a brief description
of different functional areas. We classify policies based on objectives and frameworks in section 2.2. We
present the active spaces policy model in section 2.3 and conclude with a discussion of pervasive systems
and active spaces in section 2.4.
2.1 Policy-based Management
Policy-based management has been successfully used for well over a decade as an administrative interface
for managing various systems such as network switches [BLK00], content distribution networks [VCA02] and
distributed systems [Slo94]. Policies provide a convenient means of guiding the behavior of a system using
a set of rules. These rules dictate the corrective actions that should be taken in different circumstances;
set limits and constraints to states reached by various system components; prioritize one admin task over
another and define access rights of entities. In this thesis, we restrict our focus to obligation rules, which
are rules that are enforced in reaction to certain situations and are specified using reaction rule framework.
Many network components and several distributed systems have used policies to manage system config-
urations, faults, performance and security. The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference model has
identified five functional areas for systems management (ISO/IEC 7498-4, 1989) [ISO89]. These functional
areas, commonly associated with the acronym FCAPS, are as follows [Lup98]:
Fault Management includes generation, correlation and distribution of alarms, diagnosis of failures
and corrective actions.
Configuration Management includes configurations of network and computational resources, software
resources and components of distributed applications.
Accounting Management includes issues with billing, logging and modeling of accountable resources.
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Figure 2.1: Policy Classification
Performance Management is concerned with performance of the system and associated actions such
as monitoring, load-balancing to maintain quality of service and capacity planning.
Security Management covers security of the system, authorization, authentication, access control and
privacy issues.
The scope of our thesis is restricted to fault and configuration management in active spaces. Obligation
rules can be also used for accounting and performance management though we do not address them in this
thesis. Security management in active spaces has been addressed in prior research works [AM05, Sam05].
2.2 Policy Classification
Policies can be broadly classified into access-control, obligation, goal-based and meta policies based on
their purpose. They can also be classified into reaction, constraint and priority policies based on the rule
framework used. Figure 2.1 illustrates the two classifications.
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Access control policies are concerned with limiting the activities of legitimate users who have been
successfully authenticated [M.D93, SS97]. These policies specify what actions entities can or cannot perform
in a system [Slo94]. Access control policies can be further classified into authorization, delegation and
information filtering policies. Authorization policies define what activities a member of the subject domain
can perform on the set of objects in the target domain [Dam02]. Delegation policies transfer access rights
from one entity to another. This transfer can either be temporary or permanent. Information filtering
policies transform data and are normally used to implement privacy by data obfuscation. For example, the
location information of a person can be reported with lesser accuracy to prevent the exact position from
being revealed using information filtering policies.
Obligation policies are concerned with enforcing specified activities in a system in specific circumstances.
These policies specify what actions entities must or must not perform in a system [Slo94]. Typically obli-
gation policies are used for fault and configuration management, file system management, executing main-
tenance jobs such as backing up and checkpointing and so on. These policies can be classified into must
policies and refrain policies. Must policies dictate the actions that must be enforced by the system while
refrain policies specify the actions that must not be enforced. Refrain policies are normally implemented as
negative authorization policies by restricting access to those actions.
Goal-based policies are a declarative means of specifying the desired system behavior. These policies
specify the final system state that should be reached from a given state. Planning-based techniques are
employed to determine the set of actions that need to be executed for the state transition [AHS05, RC04].
Meta-policies are policies that guide the behavior of the management system. These policies are used to
resolve conflicts, modify policies at runtime and change various parameters of the management system.
As mentioned above, policies can also be classified based on the rule framework used. Reaction policies
are specified using some form of the event-condition-action (ECA) framework. These policies facilitate
expression of situation-action pairs and provide an imperative means to specify the behavior of the system.
Access-control and obligation policies are examples of reaction policies.
Constraint policies restrict the states that entities can attain. These policies are used to specify perfor-
mance bounds, desired system states in different situations and in role-based management for constraint-
based inheritance [SCFY96]. Goal-based policies are examples of constraint policies. Constraint policies are
normally specified as a conjunction of predicates.
Priority policies are used to choose an approach in a range of possible approaches. These include policies
for choosing a rule among a set of conflicting rules and ordering enforcement of multiple triggered rules
based on some metrics. Priority policies do not use explicit rule frameworks and have been specified in
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different ways in different projects. IBM PMAC priority policies assign priority values to rules that are
used for conflict resolution [ACG+05]. The Rei language uses priority policies to define priority relationships
between rules [Kag04]. We use implications as priority rules for conflict resolution[SC05]. Some meta-policies
are examples of priority policies.
2.3 Active Space Policy Model
The active space management system uses the policy model and language presented in [CLN00, LBN99]. The
language, called Policy Description Language (PDL), uses the ECA rule framework for rule specification.
We briefly describe the syntax of the language to aid in the explanation of the model.
A policy is a set of event-condition-action rules of the form
on event if condition do action
This rule is a read as: “If the event occurs in a situation where the condition is true, then the action is
executed”.
PDL consists of three basic classes of symbols: primitive event symbols, action symbols and constant
symbols. Formally, a policy is a finite collection of ECA rules, having event, condition and action parts.
The event part of a policy rule is a term of the form e(t1, ..., tn) where e is a primitive event symbol of n
arguments and each ti is a constant or a typed variable of the form T v, where T represents a data type and
v is a variable. The action part of a policy rule is an action term of the form a(t1, ..., tm) where a is an
action symbol of m arguments and each ti is a variable that appears in the event or condition parts of the
rule or a constant. The condition part of an ECA rule is an expression of the form p1 && p2 && ...&& pk
where each pi is a predicate of the form x1θx2 and each xi is a constant, a variable that appears in the event
part of the rule or a function and θ is a relational operator.
A finite set of event instances is termed as an epoch. The notations event(r), condition(r) and action(r)
are used to denote the event, condition and action parts of a rule r, respectively.
2.3.1 Event Reception Model
Our policy framework views a situation as a set of correlated events and evaluates the policy based on the
events in the set. Event correlation is a well-researched problem and numerous models have been proposed
to group events corresponding to a change [NYGS, KYY+95, HPO]. Since the focus of our work is on policy
evaluation and enforcement, we use a simple event correlation model based on epochs proposed by Chomicki
et al. [CLN00] for policy evaluation. In this model, the event reception time axis is divided into discrete
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intervals. All events received in an interval, by the management system, are assumed to be correlated and
correspond to the same situation. In figure 2.2(a) events e1, e2 and e3 are assumed to be correlated. This
model is useful in systems with little dependencies between events.
Assume a time interval, δ. Ci : (e1, ..., en) represents the sequence of events, e1, ..., en, received by the
event reception system corresponding to change Ci. time(e) represents the time at which event e was received
by the reception system. The model can be described formally as:
C1 : (e1, ..., en)⇒ time(en)− time(ei) < δ
In addition, we considered a variant of the epoch model that groups events based on “gaps” in the event
reception time axis. A set of events is considered to be correlated, if no event is received for a minimum
duration (δ) after the last event in the set was received.
C1 : (e11, ..., e1n) < C2 : (e21, ..., e2m)⇒ time(e21)− time(e1n) ≥ δ
C : (e1, ..., ek)⇒ ∀eiei+1, time(ei+1)− time(ei) < δ
where C1 < C2 denotes that change C1 occurs before change C2.
The model is illustrated in figure 2.2(b). This model assumes that events occurring due to a change
exhibit bursty nature – all events corresponding to a change are received in one burst and a minimum delay
exists between events corresponding to two changes.
Our policy evaluation system accepts a set of events as input and therefore, the evaluation of the policy
is unaffected by the event correlation model used. The epoch model can be replaced by more appropriate
correlation models without affecting policy evaluation.
2.3.2 Policy Evaluation
The semantics of each rule (e, c, a) is defined as
occ(e) ∧ c → exec(a)
where occ(e) is true when event e is received by the evaluation system. exec(a) is the initiation of the
execution of action a.
Evaluation of a policy, P, is a mapping from a set of events, E and conditions, C to a set of actions, A:
eval(E,C)→P A
Definition 2.1: A policy rule, r, is said to be triggered in an epoch E, if event(r) ∈ E and condition(r) is
true.
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Figure 2.2: Event Reception Model
2.4 Pervasive Computing
Pervasive computing extends traditional distributed and mobile computing with knowledge of the deployed
physical environment. This knowledge enhances the power of this new computing paradigm by facilitating
better resource management, introducing more applications and enabling better integration of the physical
and digital worlds. Information about available devices in the vicinity of a mobile device enables the latter
to better optimize communication. Physical devices such as door locks, lights and various other appliances
can communicate with digital devices to assist users in performing various everyday tasks.
Numerous prototypes for pervasive computing have been developed in industry and academia. Some
projects have taken an operating system approach by identifying essential services and creating complex
architectures [RHC+02, PJKF03] while others have chosen ad-hoc approaches [KSK06, RBKI04]. Gaia
[RHC+02] and iROS [PJKF03] view a physical space of devices as a pervasive system and have operating
systems to program them. The Pervasive Information Communities Organization (PICO) [KSK06] project
supports architectures for integrating ad-hoc device clusters for just-in-time communication and proactive
collaboration. Ravi et al. [RBKI04] use ad-hoc Java based architectures for integrating devices and sup-
porting pervasive applications.
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With the success of many architectures, there is a move towards commercialization of these systems. IBM
everywhere displays have already been deployed in airports and retail environments[PPK+03]. Ubisense lo-
cation systems are being deployed in offices. When pervasive systems are deployed, they require management
systems to enforce organization guidelines. Lately, there have been some efforts in developing policy-based
management systems for pervasive systems [KFJ03]. But existing policy-based systems suffer from several
limitations that we have detailed in the next chapter. These issues have to be addressed before these systems
can be deployed in commercial settings.
2.4.1 Gaia and Active Spaces
The vision of the Active Spaces project is to create a programmable system from a collection of heterogeneous
mobile and immobile devices. An active space provides frameworks to program the system, add new services
dynamically and create multi-device applications. It can be deployed in classrooms, offices, homes, healthcare
and various other assistive environments.
An active space is enabled by a distributed operating system called Gaia. Gaia consists of a collection of
distributed components each representing a device, service or an application. Various services are provided
for fault tolerance, location awareness, security and event handling for use by pervasive applications. Figure
2.3 illustrates the architecture of Gaia.
An application framework based on the model-view-controller framework [KP88] enables applications to
be distributed across multiple heterogeneous devices [RC]. The various components of Gaia communicate
through CORBA remote procedure calls. We discuss some of the services of Gaia that are used by the
management system.
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Event Service : The Gaia event service builds on the CORBA event service, which is a publish-subscribe
based event communication system [HV99]. The CORBA event service supports both push and pull based
delivery. It does not provide support for parameterized events and any information associated with an event
has to be transferred as the payload of the event.
The Gaia event service extends the CORBA event service by providing mechanisms to store event logs
in a repository called persistent repository [Bor02]and supporting parameterized events, which are events
containing typed parameters. Parameterized events are useful to transfer additional information about an
event. For example, ObjectEnter(Device d) is a parameterized event where ObjectEnter is the event name
and d is the event parameter of type Device.
Presence Service : The Gaia presence service is used to detect membership of an entity, such as de-
vice, service or an application, in the active space. Each entity sends out heartbeat messages at periodic
intervals to announce its presence in the active space. This service is used to detect entity failures and device
exits from an active space. Each such situation generates an event on a well-known event channel.
Location Service : The Gaia location service provides position information to mobile entities in an active
space [RAS+04]. This service uses a spatial database to store spatial information of the environment and
maps the location of an entity in the database. In our active spaces, the location of an entity can be detected
by different means such as Ubisense [SG05], RFId tags, finger-print readers and so on. The location service
supports sensor fusion techniques to combine information from different sensing technologies and arrives at
an approximate location estimation of an object.
The location service also supports spatial triggers, which are events generated due to changes in the
spatial database. Triggers can be programmed to be generated when objects enter or exit a region, objects
are brought close to each other or when an object is in line-of-sight with another object. The spatial database
is implemented using PostgreSQL [Sto87] that supports complex geometric functions.
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Chapter 3
Problem Statement
This chapter presents the problems addressed by this thesis and briefly explains our approach to solving
them. Section 3.1 describes the context in which this research was performed. We discuss the problem
addressed by the thesis in detail in section 3.2 and present our solution in section 3.3. We state our thesis
in section 3.4 and conclude with a listing of the success criteria for this work.
3.1 Context
Complex systems such as pervasive systems require administrative interfaces to guide their behaviors ac-
cording to well-defined guidelines. While policy-based management has been successfully applied to manage
various simple systems, the complexity and dynamism of active spaces poses several novel challenges. Though
this thesis addresses these challenges in the context of active spaces, the challenges and the approach pre-
sented are applicable in the wider context of complex distributed systems. In this section, we identify various
characteristics of active spaces that complicate policy-based management.
3.1.1 Active Space Dynamism
An active space is a highly dynamic distributed system with mobile devices, users and applications entering
and exiting a space. The frequent addition and removal of devices from the system changes the composition
and configuration of the system, repeatedly. Each device has its own set of applications and services that
are implicitly integrated with the active space when the device is added to the system. This dynamism
complicates policy design that traditionally assumes static set of entities as found in network switches
[BLK00], content distribution networks [VCA02] and distributed systems [Slo94].
Devices may have their own management policies guiding the behavior and these policies may interfere
with those of the active space. In addition, the active space dynamism necessitates frequent policy rule
additions, removals and modifications.
17
3.1.2 Multiple Administrators
An active space may have multiple administrators managing different aspects of the space. Some administra-
tors may be concerned with management of services such as file systems, devices, sensors and actuators while
other administrators may focus on application management. In addition, active spaces may be organized
into a hierarchical system of spaces [AMSRC04] with each set of spaces being managed by an administrator.
Each administrator authors his or her own policy that is enforced by a common management system. When
different policies are combined, they may interfere with each other causing various problems such as policy
conflicts, cycles and dominance.
3.1.3 Erroneous System Components
An active space consists of heterogeneous devices, services and applications from several different vendors.
One of the primary goals of active spaces was to develop a system that can dynamically integrate diverse
components with minimum user intervention [Wei93]. These components may not be rigorously tested and
may be incompatible with other components of an active space, thus causing failure of management actions.
This complicates the management process.
3.1.4 Long-running Actions
Like many distributed systems, an active space contains actions that execute for significantly long periods of
time or throughout the running time of the active space. For example, most services of an active space start
when the space is booted and execute till the space is switched off. Many applications such as text-to-speech
converters and speech recognizers execute continuously in the background in our active space. Some of these
applications are initiated by rules on certain situations. Rules that are triggered in a different situation in
future may cause conflicts with these long-running processes.
3.2 Problem
In this section, we present the policy-related problems caused by the dynamism of complex distributed
systems, in general and active spaces, in particular. We present several policies that demonstrate the issues
faced by policies for complex systems.
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3.2.1 Policy Conflicts
A policy conflict occurs when a situation triggers two or more rules whose actions cannot execute concurrently
[CLN00]. For example, rule R1 may specify –“if a user enters an active space, turn active space lights on”.
Rule R2 may state that “after 5pm, turn off all active space lights”. If a user enters an active space after
5pm, both rules are triggered. R1 tries to turn the space lights on, while R2 mandates that all space lights
be off. This causes a conflict between the two rules.
Existing conflict detection techniques [CLN00, DIR02] detect conflicts based on conflicting actions. In
the above example, the administrator specifies that the action to turn lights on and the action to turn lights
off conflict. So when two rules containing these actions are simultaneously triggered, the rules are flagged
as conflicting by the management system. While this approach can detect a significant number of conflicts,
certain conflicts may arise from effects of actions, which may be hard to detect. For example, consider
the policy shown in figure 3.1. Both rules R3 and R4 are triggered when a person enters an active space.
R3 starts the authorization application while R4 reboots the active space, thus killing the authorization
application. Shutting down the application is a side-effect of the reboot process. In order to detect such
conflicts, information about the effects of the action must be known. Existing policy-based systems do not
provide any techniques to determine such conflicts.
R3: on (ObjectEnter(Person p)) //if user enters an active space, start authorization application
if (true)
do(startApp(“AuthApp”));
R4: on (ObjectEnter(Person p)) //if user enters an active space, reboot space
if (true)
do (rebootSpace()) ;
Figure 3.1: A Policy containing conflicts due to action effects
3.2.2 Policy Cycles
A policy cycle occurs when a set of rules trigger each other continuously [SC05]. Policy cycles may lead to
a non-terminating enforcement of a set of rules. Figure 3.2 shows a policy with cycles. Rule R5 states that
“when a person exits the space, suspend all applications”. This triggers rule R6 that starts the checkpoint
application when any application is suspended. Starting an application triggers rule R7 that checks to see
if the space is empty and if so suspends the application being started. In this policy, a cycle exists between
rules R6 and R7, if the space is empty.
Policy cycles can cause oscillations in system states. The cycle in the policy in figure 3.2 can cause the
19
R5: on (ObjectExit(Person p)) //if user exits, suspend applications
if (true)
do(suspend apps());
R6: on (suspendApp(Application App))
if (true)
do (startApp(“checkpoint app”, App)) ;
R7: on (startApp(Application App))
if(statusSpace() == “empty”)
do (suspendApp (App));
Figure 3.2: A Policy containing a cycle between rules R6 and R7
checkpoint application to be repeatedly started and suspended. This can consume valuable system resources
and confuse users. Though some cycles may be normal behavior of a system, it would be useful if policy
designers are notified of cycles as warnings.
3.2.3 Rule Enforcement Order
When multiple non-conflicting rules are triggered, the order of enforcement of the rules can determine the
final system state. For example, consider the policy shown in figure 3.3.
R8: on (ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if (statusSpace(s) = = “stopped”)
do(restartSpace(s));
R9: on (ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
do(authorizeDevice(d, s));
R10: on (ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop” && roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
do (mountFileSystem(d, s));
R11: on (ObjectExit (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop”)
do(unmountFileSystem(d, s));
Figure 3.3: Policy to Restart Hibernated Active Space
Rule R8 restarts the active space (and its various services) if it has stopped when a device enters the
space. Rule R9 authorizes a device of role guest if it enters the space. We have assigned roles to mobile
devices to differentiate between devices of different users. Rule R10 mounts a laptop’s file system onto the
active space file system [HC03] when the laptop is brought into the active space and R11 unmounts it when
the laptop leaves the space. When a guest user with a laptop enters an active space that is not running,
the location system generates an ObjectEnter event that triggers rules R8, R9 and R10. The order of
20
enforcement of the rules determines the behavior of the space. A rule is said to be enforced when its action
is executed. If R9 is enforced before R8, R9 fails since all services of the active space are stopped. Similarly,
if R10 is enforced before R8, R10 fails since the active space file system is not running. But if R8 is enforced
before R9 and R9 is enforced before R10, the active space successfully restarts, authorizes the device and
if successful, mounts the laptop’s file system. Therefore, when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered,
the order of enforcement of rules determines the final system state. A policy-based management system
must provide guarantees when multiple rules need to be concurrently enforced so that the system behavior
is predictable. Existing policy-based management systems based on ECA rules do not contain specifications
of actions required for reasoning and so do not provide guarantees which can lead to unpredictable system
states [SC06].
3.2.4 Exception Model
Actions in policy rules may fail due to errors in policies, bugs in actions or due to system errors. Most
policy enforcement systems do not verify if execution of a rule action was successful. They ignore execution
errors or assume that errors are handled by exception handlers that may be programmed within actions.
An ECA policy enables an abstraction by separating the specifications of situation-action pairs from their
implementations. This abstraction hides the intricacies of observing events in the system, verifying system
conditions and initiating actions. Each abstraction level requires its own exception model since models of
lower abstraction, such as exception handlers in actions, may not handle exceptions favorably. For example,
a rule R12 may state “If a device owned by a guest user physically enters an active space, authorize using
credentials”. The rule would be represented as:
R12: on (ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (roleDevice(d) == “guest”)
do(AutoAuthorizeDevice(d, s));
When a device enters the active space, the location system generates an ObjectEnter event. The man-
agement system receives this event, verifies if the device is owned by a guest user and if so, executes the
AutoAuthorizeDevice action. Device authorization may fail due to wrong credentials, credentials being
absent or inability to communicate with the device. In such circumstances, the administrator of the active
space may want to detect the failure and use a different means of authorization such as passwords or finger-
print verification. But the AutoAuthorizeDevice action may internally handle the exception by logging the
error message, which would be unacceptable to the administrator. Therefore, an exception model is required
to detect errors and specify corrective actions at the policy abstraction level. The ECA rule framework is
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poorly suited for verifying execution of an action since it does not contain action specifications and therefore,
relies on the action to report execution errors. Actions may not propagate the exception to the enforcement
system and may handle exceptions unfavorably. Therefore, the enforcement system incorrectly perceives
this as successful action execution. A policy-based management system should support techniques to verify
action execution and take corrective actions on failure, for effective management.
3.2.5 Long-running Actions
Active spaces contain certain management actions that execute throughout their lifetimes or for significantly
long periods of time. These include actions that trigger heartbeats, maintain certain QoS, enforce specific
states on entities and so on. The persistent nature of these actions interfere with the enforcement of rules
that are triggered in a different situation in future. For example, an active space has a rule that initiates
heartbeats in devices that are brought into the space. Heartbeats are “I’m alive” messages periodically sent
to the presence service to indicate membership and proper functioning of the device in the active space. This
action executes as long as the device is part of the active space. If a rule to turn off the device is enforced
in a different situation in future, the rule conflicts with the rule to initiate heartbeats, since turning off the
device stops heartbeats. In order to detect such conflicts, information about the behavior of the action is
required. ECA rules do not contain behavioral information of actions and are unable to detect such conflicts.
Rules with long-running actions need to be monitored to detect failures during their execution lifetimes.
Existing policy systems do not provide any mechanisms to monitor enforcement of such rules. Once initiated,
the rules are assumed to execute without any failures.
3.2.6 Policy Design and Management
The dynamism of an active space affects the management policy. When devices and applications are added
to an active space, rules to manage these new entities should be added. When these entities are taken out
of the active space, corresponding rules must be removed. Policies may need to be composed when entities
have their own rules. These issues cause additional overhead to the management system.
3.3 Solution Space
From the above set of problems, we realized that the ECA framework is poorly suited for designing man-
agement rules for active spaces since very poor static and dynamic reasoning can be performed with the
framework.
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The ECA framework has been used for designing active database triggers [BW00], authorization rules
[SNC02] and management rules [CLN00]. In the field of active database triggers, the framework has been
used to perform various kinds of analyses such as conflicts analysis, confluence analysis and termination
analysis [BW00]. Similarly, in the domain of access control, the ECA framework enables conflict analysis
[KMPP02], rights-amplification analysis [Bla03] and so on. But very poor analyses and guarantees are
provided by ECA-based management systems. We realized that for active database and access control rules,
the set of actions used is well-defined. Normally, trigger rules use the database operations insert, delete and
update, while access control rules use authorize, deny and delegate. But actions in management rules can
range from simple atomic operations to complex scripts and therefore, are not well-known. Since actions
are well-defined in the first two kinds of rules, implicitly their effect on the system is known. For example,
an insert operation increases the number of records in a database by 1. Similarly, the authorize operation
grants access rights to an entity. In order to enable similar reasoning with management rules, information
about the effects of an action on a system must be explicitly provided.
Therefore, we introduce an extended framework of ECA called Event-Condition-Precondition-Action-
Post condition (ECPAP) for designing management rules for active spaces. ECPAP rules contain axiomatic
specifications of rule actions in first-order predicate logic as pre- and post-conditions. The pre-condition
specifies the partial system state before execution of rule action and post-condition specifies the partial
system state once the action has successfully executed. The rule condition is different from pre-condition
because the rule condition is specified by the policy designer while the pre-condition is specified by the action
developer (programmer).
The ECPAP framework has been successfully used to detect conflicts due to effects of actions [SRC05],
policy cycles [SC05], determining enforcement order of rules [SC06], policy exception handling and reasoning
about policies with long-running actions. We describe each of these in detail in the rest of the thesis.
3.4 Thesis Statement
From the description of the context, problem and solution space, we state the thesis as follows:
Management rules for active spaces require specifications of management actions to be stated explicitly to
enhance static and dynamic reasoning. Extending management rules with specifications of actions facilitates
conflict detection, cycle detection, definition of enforcement semantics, confluence analysis, enforcement
monitoring and reasoning with long-running actions. This new framework enables deterministic policy-based
management.
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3.5 Success Criteria
This thesis addresses a range of problems with policy-based management systems using the ECPAP frame-
work. The solution to each problem is evaluated based on its algorithmic complexity and overhead imposed
on the system. In addition, we propose the following criteria to evaluate this thesis :
• Can this framework detect a larger class of conflicts than current conflict detection techniques ?
• Can this framework be used for detecting cycles in a set of policy rules ?
• If multiple rules are triggered in a situation, can this framework enable reasoning to determine a
predictable order of rule enforcement ?
• Can this framework enable an exception model for policies ?
• Can this framework support reasoning for policies with long-running actions ?
• Does the framework enable determinism in management ?
• Is the overhead of policy reasoning acceptable in practical systems ?
In addition, we study the feasibility of using the ECPAP framework on two distributed systems. These
studies provide empirical evaluations of the correctness of the analysis techniques and demonstrate the
usefulness of the framework on complex distributed systems.
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Chapter 4
Specification-enhanced Policy
Framework
In this chapter, we describe the policy framework based on Event-Condition-Precondition-Action-Postcondition
(ECPAP) rules. In section 4.1, we discuss the requirements of the policy system. We present the policy
framework in section 4.2 with examples. In section 4.3 we discuss the policy enforcement process and
conclude the chapter.
4.1 Requirements
An active space contains several heterogeneous entities, each having its own set of management guidelines.
This heterogeneity necessitates a policy language that supports a rich set of events, data types and opera-
tions. The language should be extensible to accommodate new events, types and operations as entities are
introduced into the active space. Existing policy languages [LBN99, KFJ03] are fairly static with regard to
supported events and types.
The policy framework should support a specification language that allows actions to be described ax-
iomatically and behaviorally. Action specifications contain the system states that are reached and events
generated due to action execution. The language should contain an easy-to-specify methodology and a rich
set of operators for formal specifications of actions.
Policy errors should be detected statically so that policy designers can be notified before enforcement.
The policy framework should provide support for debugging and profiling of policies. Existing policy systems
provide little or no support for policy error detection.
The management policy gets modified when entities are added or removed from an active space. The
policy system should provide interfaces to support rule modifications and policy composition.
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4.2 Policy Framework
4.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The management system uses policies that are formulated as sets of event-condition-action rules of the form
on (ruleid, event) if (condition) do (action)
A policy rule is read as: “When event occurs in a situation where condition is true, then action is
executed”. ruleid is an identifier that uniquely identifies a rule in the policy. The action is a call to a
method in a library of actions where each action is annotated with a pre-condition and a post-condition
by the action developer (programmer). For the purpose of analysis, we consider our policy rules to be
of the form event-condition-precondition-action-postcondition (ECPAP), although pre-conditions and post-
conditions are not specified as part of the rules. We make the distinction between an action developer and a
policy designer. An action developer is responsible for developing the management action of an active space.
These actions are part of the services that are developed for a managed entity. For example, a mobile device
contains services for device hibernation; battery power estimation; secondary storage access; application
initiation and so on. These are actions developed by the vendor of the device and is used by the device user.
When the device is used in an active space, it needs to be managed according to the guidelines set by the
organization. A policy designer encodes these guidelines as rules. So this distinction is important.
We represent an ECPAP rule as (e, c, p)→ (a, s) where e denotes the rule event, c denotes the condition
of the rule, p is the pre-condition of the rule action, a, and s is the action post-condition. Our policy rule
framework extends that of Policy Description Language (PDL) [LBN99] by adding axiomatic specifications
as “extension”s to the rule.
Similar to PDL, there are three basic classes of symbols: primitive event symbols, action symbols and
constant symbols. Primitive event symbols represent basic events that can be subscribed to in the system.
For example, ObjectEnter and ObjectExit are primitive event symbols that are generated by the location
system when any object physically enters or exits a geographic region, respectively. An event is a primitive
event symbol or a term of the form e(T1 t1, ..., Tn tn), where e is a primitive event symbol of n arguments
and each ti is a variable of type Ti. Ti can be a simple type such as int, float, char or a complex type
consisting of a set of attributes of simple or other complex types. The condition part of an ECPAP rule
is an expression of the form p1 && p2 && ... && pm where each pi is a predicate of the form x1θx2 and
each xi is a constant, a variable that appears in the event part of the rule or a function and θ is a relational
operator. Each action symbol denotes the name of a procedure that can be invoked in the system. An
action is of the form proc(t1, ..., tw) where proc is an action symbol and tis are parameters. For example,
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restartSpace(s) is an action where s denotes an active space. Pre- and post-conditions of an action are
first-order predicate logic formulas of the form p1 (&&/||pk)
k=2..l, where each pi is a first-order predicate of
the form Q1t1...Qvtv pred(t1, ..., tv): Qi is an optional quantifier and each ti is a constant or a variable.
The policy grammar is presented in appendix I.
A policy, P is a finite set of ECPAP rules. The management system enforcing the policy expects as input
an event, e and its occurrence is represented by occ(e). The semantics of each rule, (e, c, p)→ (a, s) in the
policy is specified by the implication,
occ(e) ∧ c ∧ p→ exec(a)
exec(a)→ ♦s
where exec(a) represents the initiation of the execution of action a. ♦ is the eventually temporal operator
and ♦s means that s becomes true after a few execution steps. We interpret ♦s as bounded eventually
implying that s becomes true in a bounded number of execution steps or the action is assumed to have
failed. The number of steps is system dependent and is independent of the ECPAP rule framework.
The post-conditions of actions can also specify the events generated using the event predicate. The
predicate takes in a string expression denoting the event and evaluates to true when the event has been ob-
served. For example, the post-condition
∧
∀App∈Applications event(suspendEvent(< App >))∧ statusApp(<
App >, “suspended”) is a predicate expression specifying the events that are generated and the status of the
applications once all events have been observed. Variables are specified using angle brackets – <>. These
variables are replaced by their values when the predicate expression is converted to a propositional expres-
sion at runtime. If the set Applications = {authapp, checkpointapp, demoapp} at runtime, the expression is
expanded to
(event(suspendEvent(“authapp”))∧ statusApp(“authapp”, “suspended”))∧
(event(suspendEvent(“checkpointapp”))∧ statusApp(“checkpointapp”, “suspended”))∧
(event(suspendEvent(“demoapp”))∧ statusApp(“demoapp”, “suspended”))).
The ordering of events can also be specified using temporal operators. This ordering enables more
complex evaluations and aids monitoring of rule enforcement. Currently, we support the next temporal
operator represented as©. event(p) ∧ ©event(q) implies that event q is received after event p by the event
reception system.
Gaia uses asynchronous communication and therefore, can be modeled using actors [Agh86]. Each service
in Gaia is represented as an actor. The rule enforcement system can be considered to be a special actor
that receives asynchronous events from the Gaia system. Rules in the actor get evaluated and messages are
generated that invoke actions on the other actors. The modelling is pictorially illustrated in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Actor modeling of rule evaluation
In addition, we also introduce an operator called choice to list the possible set of states that can be taken
after an action execution. Only one of the listed states is reached after action execution. This operator is
denoted by unionsq. s1 unionsq s2 unionsq ... unionsq sn is read as “choice of s1 or s2 or ... sn”. A choice-set of a choice-expression,
p1 unionsq ... unionsq pn, is the set {p1, ..., pn}. This operator is useful when the state reached after an execution is
known to belong to a set of states but cannot be predicted in advance. We present some examples below:
{true}
toggleLight(); //toggle state of light
{statusLight(on) unionsq statusLight(off)}
{true}
x = random(n); //generate random number between 0 and n-1
{
⊔
y=0..n−1 x=y)}
The semantics of the unionsq operator differs with the analysis. We discuss in each analysis how the operator
is treated.
4.2.2 Action Specifications
The ECPAP framework extends the ECA framework by using the Hoare triple [Hoa69]. A Hoare triple
represented as {P} C {Q} describes how an action C changes the state of computation from a state where
P is true to a state where Q is true. P and Q, expressed as first-order predicate logic expressions, are pre-
and post-conditions of C, respectively and are called axiomatic specifications. The pre-condition specifies
the system state that should exist before C can be executed and the post-condition specifies the system
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state that exists once C completes execution.
Specification-enhanced programming and system management have recently gained prominence as im-
portant approaches to reducing programming and management efforts of complex systems [SC05, SRC05,
SC06, AHS05, RC04, Sri05]. In [SC05, SRC05] we showed how extending actions with specifications enabled
advanced conflict and termination analysis for policy-based management systems. In [SC06] we demon-
strated the advantages of the ECPAP framework for ordering rule enforcement. Andrzejak et al. [AHS05]
have used actions with pre- and post-conditions for planning complex workflows from simple actions for
system management. Anand et al. [RC04] use specification-enhanced actions, expressed as pre-conditions
and effects, for programming pervasive computing environments. The ABLE project [Sri05] uses axiomatic
specifications of actions for goal-based autonomic computing. All of these approaches have shown that
providing specifications for actions is a feasible extension that provides numerous benefits.
In this thesis, we assume that the specifications are correct and complete to the extent required for
analysis. The specifications describe the changes that happen to the system due to action execution. Dealing
with incorrect specifications is an orthogonal problem, which we briefly discuss in chapter 13.
4.2.3 ECPAP Examples
In this section, we present some example ECPAP rules with short descriptions. The pre- and post-conditions
of actions are specified above and below each rule action for ease of reading and are not specified as part of
the rules in the actual policy.
R41: on(DevicePlugin(Device d))
if(d.type == “compute”)
{authorizationstatus(d, authorized)}
do(queryResourceList(d));
{resourceListReceiveStatus(d, received)}
R41 gets triggered when a device is plugged into the active space. If the device is of type “compute”
and has been authorized, the system queries the list of resources available on the device. If the action is
successful, the resource list is received.
R42: on(ClusterPlugin(Cluster c))
if(true)
{true}
do(authorizeDevicesinCluster(c));
{forall node .in. c, authorizationStatus(node, authorized)}
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R42 gets triggered when a cluster of nodes is added to an active space. All nodes of the cluster are
authorized with the space. This example demonstrates the usage of first order expressions in the action
post-condition.
R43: on(ObjectEnter(Person p))
if(true)
{true}
do(lightsStatus(“on”));
{.henceforth. statusDevice(“Lights”, “on”)}
R43 turns on the lights in an active space when a person enters the space. The post-condition specifies
that the lights remain on henceforth. This expression uses the henceforth temporal operator to describe the
long-running action lightsStatus. Rules with long-running actions are described in chapter 7.
4.3 Policy Enforcement Process
The policy enforcement process is illustrated in Figure 4.2 as a flowchart. A policy is compiled and checked
for conflicts and cycles using static analysis techniques [SRC05, SC05]. An object file is generated if the
policy is free of static conflicts and loaded into the management system. The management system subscribes
to events in the policy rules and waits for events to occur. Once an event is received, the management system
determines the set of triggered rules. It analyzes the set for dynamic conflicts [SRC05] and resolves them
using priorities. It determines the enforcement order of rules and constructs a Petri net workflow [SC06].
This workflow is executed by a workflow execution engine. The management system verifies action execution
after each action completes. If an action fails, the system generates exception events and determines the
exception handlers in the policy triggered by the events. It reconstructs the workflow with the new actions
and executes it. Currently, we process each event separately and if subscribed events are generated during
the workflow execution they are cached in the event reception system for processing in a queue. The different
phases of enforcement are described in detail in the rest of the thesis.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the ECPAP framework that we have used in this thesis for policy design. The
framework supports axiomatic specification of actions. Some behavioral aspects of the actions can also be
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart of Policy Enforcement
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described using temporal operators. The management system built with the ECPAP framework offers enough
flexibility to add new events, data types and operations dynamically. The framework is being extended to
support more complex behavioral expressions as discussed in chapter 13.
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Chapter 5
Conflict and Cycle Analysis
In this chapter, we explore the conflict analysis and resolution problem. Prior research works on conflict
analysis address rule conflicts that occur due to conflicting actions. Section 5.1 presents examples of rule
conflicts that occur due to conflicting action effects and shows how the ECA framework is unable to detect
such conflicts. We describe the ECPAP approach to conflict and cycle analysis in sections 5.2 and 5.3,
respectively. We evaluate the algorithms in section 5.4 and conclude the chapter.
5.1 Policy Conflicts
A policy conflict arises when, on an event-condition, multiple conflicting actions become eligible for execution
and the system cannot decide on the action to be executed [SRC05]. For example, consider the policy shown
in figure 5.1.
Rule R51 mounts a device’s file system onto the active space file system, when the device is brought into
the active space. Rule R52 restarts all active space services when an administrator’s device is brought into
the active space. In order to mount a device file system onto that of the active space, the file system of the
active space should be running. Therefore, the actions of the two rules conflict with each other. When a
“compute” device of an administrator is brought into the space both rules are triggered and this leads to a
rule conflict.
Previous research works on conflict detection for obligation policies define conflicts as violations of action
constraints [CLN00, Slo94, KFJ03]. Action constraints specify the set of actions that cannot occur together
R51: on(r51, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(d.type == “compute”)
do(mountFileSystem(d));
R52: on(r52, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(d.owner == “admin”)
do(restartActiveSpaceServices());
Figure 5.1: Policy containing rule conflicts due to conflicting actions
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R53: on(r53, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(d.type == “compute”)
do(startAuthorization(d));
R54: on(r54, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(true)
do(stopAllApps(d));
R55: on(r55, ObjectExit(Person p))
if (p.role == “owner”)
do(startApp(“logApp”));
R56: on(r56, ObjectExit(Person p))
if(person count() == 0) //space is empty
do(suspendSpace());
Figure 5.2: Policy containing rule conflicts due to conflicting action effects
as a predicate: ¬(a1∧ ...∧an) where ai is an action term. In the above example, the action constraint would
be specified as ¬(mountF ileSystem(Device) ∧ restartActiveSpaceServices). When two or more rules are
triggered, the enforcement system checks to see if the set of rules satisfies the action constraint. The actions
of the triggered rules are asserted into a Prolog knowledge base. The action constraint is queried to check
if it is satisfied.
(mountF ileSystem(Device)∧ restartActiveSpaceServices) 6|=
¬(mountF ileSystem(Device)∧ restartActiveSpaceServices)
Since the above policy violates the constraint when R51 and R52 are triggered, the resulting situation is
flagged as a conflict.
5.1.1 Conflicts Due to Action Effects
While the action constraint approach to conflict detection can detect modality conflicts – inconsistencies
arising from actions being permitted and prohibited [LS99], conflicts due to temporal events and roles
[DIR02] and conflicts due to opposing obligation and authorization policies [LBN99], they cannot detect
conflicts arising from effects of actions. For example, consider the policy in figure 5.2.
The action of R53, startAuthorization, authorizes a device when it is brought into an active space, while
the action of R54, stopAllApps, stops all applications running on the device. A device is authorized by
the authorization application. When both rules are triggered, startAuthorization action starts the autho-
rization application, while stopAllApps action stops all applications resulting in stopping the authorization
application too. This causes a conflict between the two rules. Stopping of the authorization application by
the stopAllApps action is an effect of the action. In order to detect such a conflict, each set of actions has to
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R53: on(r53, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(d.type == “compute”)
{true}
do(startAuthorization(d));
{statusApp(authApp, running}
R54: on(r54, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(true)
{true}
do(stopAllApps(d));
{statusApp(logApp, stopped) && statusApp(authApp, stopped)}
R55: on(r55, ObjectExit(Person p))
if(p.role == “owner”)
{statusSpace(running)}
do(startApp(“logApp”));
{statusApp(logApp, running)}
R56: on(r56, ObjectExit(Person p))
if(person count == 0) //space is empty
{statusSpace(running)}
do(suspendSpace());
{forall app .in. spaceApps(), statusApp(app, stopped)}
Figure 5.3: Policy Rules in the ECPAP Framework
be manually analyzed by the system administrator to determine if they conflict with each other. This may
be infeasible as the system administrator may not know the complete effect of the action on the system. In
addition, this approach does not scale well with the large number of actions in an active space.
Similarly, a conflict exists between rules R55 and R56 since suspending the space suspends all applications
including logApp that checkpoints application data into the active space file system.
Typical examples of conflicts due to action effects include rules that turn off a device and start an
application on the same device, increase file system quota for a user while simultaneously reducing the
service quality (which decreases the file system quota for the user) and start two applications that need a
common non-sharable resource.
5.2 Policy Conflict Detection
In order to detect policy conflicts due to effects of actions, we need to express these rules using the ECPAP
framework and redefine policy conflicts as violations of post-condition constraints [SRC05]. The rules in
the ECPAP framework are shown in figure 5.3. A post-condition constraint is a predicate that expresses a
state that the system should not reach and is an expression of the form ¬(p1 ∧ ... ∧ pm), where each pi is a
predicate representing a part of the state of the system.
We say that a set of post-conditions, K, satisfies a post-condition constraint pc in a system, if K is a
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model of pc, in the standard model theoretic sense [CLN00]. This means that the post-conditions in K do
not violate constraint pc. We use the standard notation K |= pc to denote this relationship.
Definition 5.1: K is said to be a non-conflicting post-condition set for pc, if K |= pc. In other words, the
post-condition predicates in K can all be simultaneously true in the system and so the system can reach a
state that is expressed by the conjunction of those predicates. If K 6|= pc, then K is said to be a conflict.
Similarly, an action set S satisfies an action constraint ac if S is a model of ac and is denoted as S |= ac
[CLN00]. If S 6|= ac, then S is said to be a conflict in the policy.
Definition 5.2: Given an action constraint ac = ¬(a1 ∧ ... ∧ an), we define an equivalent post-condition
constraint, epc of ac, as a predicate ¬(p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn) such that pi represents the post-condition of action ai.
Note that pi can be a conjunction of other predicates. It is represented as epc =e ac.
Theorem 5.1: The set of conflicts detected using action constraints is a subset of the set of conflicts
detected using equivalent post-condition constraints.
Proof: Consider an action constraint ac and a post-condition constraint pc for a policy such that pc =e ac.
To prove the above theorem, we have to show that for every action set S, S 6|= ac, there is a post-condition
set K such that K 6|= pc.
Let K = {pi|∀ai ∈ S, pi is the post-condition predicate of ai}
S 6|= ac ⇒ ∃a1, ...∃as ∈ S|{a1, ..., as} 6|= ac
⇒ {p1, ..., ps} 6|= pc, where pi is the post-condition predicate of ai and pc =e ac
⇒ K 6|= pc (since pi ∈ K )
Therefore, all conflicts detected by action constraints can be detected using equivalent post-condition
constraints. 2
The active space management system uses a combination of static and dynamic conflict detection tech-
niques. Static detection is used by the policy compiler to detect conflicts at compile time. These conflicts
include conflicts among rules whose event and condition parts can be statically matched. Dynamic detection
is used at run-time to detect conflicts among rules that have been triggered.
We present our algorithms for static and dynamic conflict detection below. The static detection al-
gorithm displays a set of conflicting rules which the user has to resolve. All conflicting rules cannot be
detected by static analysis since this requires establishing equivalence among event and condition parts of
rules. Determining equivalence between any two event and condition expressions requires model-checking or
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theorem-proving techniques, which are computationally intensive since they involve generating a large num-
ber of states. The problem of determining if two relational expressions are equal can even be undecidable.
We employ dynamic conflict detection techniques to detect remaining conflicts at runtime (when we can eval-
uate all the conditions), and use meta-rules to resolve them. Some policy-based systems [CLN00, KFJ03]
employ resolution policies to resolve all policy conflicts. This requires specification of resolution rules for
all possible conflicts. Detecting and resolving as many conflicts as possible, statically (before the policy is
actually loaded into the system), reduces the number of dynamic resolution rules that need to be specified.
This is similar to the approach taken by other rule-based systems such as parser-generators where the user
has to resolve all conflicting production rules before the parser is generated.
5.2.1 Static Detection
Static detection is used to detect conflicts among rules whose events and conditions can be statically matched.
In order to determine if two event terms match, we compare their event symbols and types and values of their
parameters. For example, in the policy in figure 5.1, event terms of rules R51 and R52 match. Static matching
can be extended with unification to match a variable with possible values that the variable can take based
on its data type. ObjectEnter(Person p) matches ObjectEnter(“Tom”), since the event symbols match
and “Tom” is an instance of data type Person. A conjunctive condition expression C1 matches another
expression C2 if the number of predicates of C1 equals that of C2 and for every predicate in C1 there is a
corresponding lexically-equivalent predicate in C2.
Figure 5.4 shows the algorithm for static conflict detection. The algorithm is initialized with the post-
condition constraint set, PC, and the policy specified as ECPAP rules. Each rule, r, in the policy is evaluated
against other rules in the policy. If the event, conditions and pre-conditions of rule r match those of another
rule s, the post-condition of rule s is added to a set, K. Once all rules have been evaluated, the post-condition
of rule r is added to set K. The union of K and PC is checked for consistency. We use a Prolog reasoner
called XSB [XSB] to check for consistency among predicates. The predicates of post-conditions of rules in
K are asserted into the Prolog knowledge base. For every post-condition constraint in PC, the truth value
of each predicate of the constraint is checked. If more than one predicate evaluates to true for a constraint,
it implies that the constraint has been violated and the union of K and PC is considered inconsistent.
If the union set is consistent then there are no conflicts among the set of rules that match the events,
conditions and pre-conditions of rule r. If the union set is inconsistent, the corresponding rules are flagged
as being in conflict and their identification numbers are displayed.
Applying this algorithm to the policy in figure 5.3 with the post-condition constraint
37
//initialize
PC : post-condition constraint set
P : the Policy
event(r) : event of rule r
id(r) : rule identifier of rule r
condition(r) : condition of rule r
precond(r) : pre-condition of rule r
post (r) : post-condition of rule r
//statically detect conflicts for each rule
for each rule r in P
e := event(r)
c := condition(r)
p := precond(r)
K := {}
R := {} //rule id set
for each rule s in P and s 6= r
if(match(event(s), e) && match(condition(s), c) && match(precond(s), p))
K := K ∪ post(s)
R := R ∪ id(s)
endif
end for
K := K ∪ post(r)
if (K ∪ PC) is not consistent
print R
endif
end for
Figure 5.4: Static Conflict Detection Algorithm
P1 : ¬(status(App, running) ∧ status(App, stopped))
detects that rules R53 and R54 are conflicting, since the authorization application cannot be simultane-
ously in the running and stopped states according to the above constraints. However, the conflict between
rules R55 and R56 is not detected since their condition expressions are not found to match statically.
5.2.2 Dynamic Detection
Once the user resolves the above conflict, the policy compiler generates a policy object file. This is loaded
into the management service. The management service subscribes to events specified in the policy rules.
When an ObjectExit(Person) event is received, the management service determines the set of rules triggered
by the event, which in this case are rules R55 and R56. The condition expressions of the triggered rules are
evaluated. If an expression is satisfied, the rule is said to be activated and is added to an activation set.
If the person who exits the space is an “owner” and the space is empty, rules R55 and R56 are both added
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to the activation set. The activation set is analyzed to determine any conflicts. The algorithm for detecting
the conflicts is presented in figure 5.5.
PC : post-condition constraint set
AS : activation set
K := {}
for each rule r in AS
K := K ∪ {post(r)}
end for
if (K ∪ PC) is not consistent
resolve conflict
Figure 5.5: Dynamic Conflict Detection Algorithm
The algorithm collects the post-conditions of all activated rules and checks if its union with the post-
condition constraint set is consistent. If it is not consistent, a conflict is concluded and the rules are sent
to a conflict-resolver for resolution. For the example in figure 5.2, the algorithm detects a conflict between
rules R55 and R56 since logApp application cannot be in the running and stopped states simultaneously,
according to the post-condition constraint. The conflicts are sent to a conflict resolver for resolution.
5.2.3 Conflict Analysis with the unionsq Operator
The unionsq operator lists the set of possible post-conditions reached by a system. Only one post-condition among
the set may cause a conflict with another triggered rule. We take a conservative approach by considering
the possibility of the system reaching the conflicting post-condition. Therefore, the system analyzes each
post-condition predicate with that of the other triggered rules for conflicts. Since these post-conditions are
not guaranteed to occur, the possible conflicts are listed as warnings to the user.
Definition 5.3: An action with post-condition (p1 unionsq ...unionsq pn) conflicts with an action with post-condition x
if
∨
i=1..n((pi ∧ x) 6|= pc) where pc is the post-condition constraint.
5.2.4 Conflict Resolution using Resolution Policies
Policy conflicts are resolved using rules that specify the post-condition that the system can reach from a
given condition. These rules are called resolution rules since they determine the rule to be executed from a
set of conflicting rules. A set of resolution rules is called a resolution policy.
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A resolution rule, m is specified as a simple if-then statement
if condition then postcondition
This is read as: “if the system is in state represented by condition, then the system is preferred to reach
the state represented by post-condition”. The resolution technique prioritizes one rule over another by stating
that if two conflicting post-conditions can occur, then one of the post-condition is preferred over the other.
The resolution algorithm, presented below, chooses the action corresponding to the preferred post-condition.
This approach is similar to priority-based conflict resolution schemes [LBN99, CLN00, KFJ03] except that
post-conditions are prioritized instead of actions. The condition of m is represented as cond(m) and post-
condition as post(m). The condition and post-condition expressions of resolution rules are represented similar
to that of policy rules.
The resolution policy for the example in figure 5.3 is
M1 : if (event(ObjectExit) ∧ can reach(status(log app,running)) ∧ can reach (status(log app, stopped))
then can reach(status(log app, running)
event(e) represents a predicate that determines if event e is the triggering event for any of the conflicting
rules. can reach(p) represents a predicate that determines if predicate p is in any of the post-conditions
of the conflicting rules. So the resolution rule, M1 implies that if ObjectExit event occurs and application
log app can reach states running and stopped by the execution of the conflicting rules, then choose the rule
corresponding to the post-condition can reach(status(log app, running)).
Definition 5.4: A post-condition predicate p is preferred by a resolution policy M = {m1, ...,mn} if there
exists a resolution rule m in M , such that post(m) = p and cond(m) is true. p is unpreferred otherwise.
When a conflict occurs, the conflict-resolver is invoked with the conflicting rules and the resolution policy.
The conflict-resolution algorithm presented in figure 5.6 takes in a conflict-set C that contains the set of
conflicting rules and a resolution policy M and determines the rule to be executed. The post-condition of
each rule in the conflict-set is evaluated against M to determine if the rule-action can be executed. This is
done by checking to see if each predicate of the post-condition is satisfied by M . If all predicates of a post-
condition are satisfied by M the corresponding rule is considered for execution by adding it to the output
set N . If more than one rule is considered for execution, these rules may possibly conflict among since they
come from the conflict-set and so we conclude that the conflict resolution process was not able to resolve
policy conflicts with the given resolution rules. Detecting the maximal subset of a conflict-set such that no
rules of the subset conflict requires advanced analysis techniques such as confluence analysis [BW00] and is
discussed in 6. Therefore, the resolution algorithm chooses rule R55. The management system executes the
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C : Conflict rule set //set of conflicting rules
N : output rule set
M : resolution policy
post(s) : post-condition of rule s
condition(m) : condition of resolution rule m
post-condition(m) : post-condition of resolution rule m
evaluate(p) : returns evaluated value of expression p
preferred(p,M) : returns true if p is preferred by M and false otherwise
N = {}
for each rule r in C
k = true
for each predicate p in post(r)
k = k & preferred(p, M)
end for
if k = = true //rule should be executed
N = N ∪ r
end if
end for
if cardinality(N) > 1
notify user
else
return N
//function preferred
Boolean preferred(p, M)
for each resolution-rule m in M
if (match(post-condition(m), p))
return evaluate(condition(m))
end if
end for
return false
Figure 5.6: Dynamic Conflict Resolution Algorithm
rule action of R55 and ignores R56.
5.3 Policy Cycles
A policy may contain a non-terminating sequence of rule executions where action of one rule may trigger
another rule in a cycle. Figure 5.7 shows a policy with cycles. Rule R57 states that “when a person exits
the space, suspend all applications”. This triggers rule R58 that starts the checkpoint application when any
application is suspended. Starting an application triggers rule R59 that checks to see if the space is empty
and if so suspends the application being started. In this policy, a cycle exists between rules R58 and R59, if
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R57: on(r57, ObjectExit(Person p)) //if user exits, suspend applications
if (true)
{true}
do(suspend apps())
{forall App.in. Applications, event(suspendApp(App)) && statusApp(App, suspended)}
R58 : on (r58, suspendApp(Application App))
if (true)
{true}
do (startApp(checkpoint app(App)))
{event(startApp(checkpoint app)) && statusApp(checkpoint app, suspended)}
R59 : on (r59, startApp(Application App))
if(statusSpace() == “empty”)
{true}
do (suspendApp (App))
{event(suspendApp(App)) && statusApp(App, suspended)}
Figure 5.7: A Policy containing a Cycle
the space is empty.
Annotating rule actions with axiomatic specifications enables us to reason about the policy to detect
cycles. The policy compiler analyzes the policy and reports any cycles.
A rule r1 triggers another rule r2 in a policy if the execution of action of r1 generates an event that
matches event of rule r2. We use static analysis techniques to determine if an event specified in the post-
condition matches an event specified in the rule. When the policy is compiled, a trigger graph is created that
specifies which rule triggers which other rules in the policy. A trigger graph of a policy is a directed graph
whose vertices represent rules and edges represent the triggers relation. The trigger graph of the policy in
figure 5.7 is shown in figure 5.8.
Definition 5.4 : A trigger graph for a policy P, denoted by Trig(P) is an ordered pair (P, E) such that
E = {(r1, r2)| ∀r1, r2 ∈ P, r1 triggers r2}.
R57 R59R58
Figure 5.8: Trigger graph for policy in figure 5.7
The trigger graph construction algorithm is shown in figure 5.9. A policy contains a cycle only if a cycle
exists in the trigger graph of the policy. Note that a cycle in a trigger graph does not imply a cycle in the
policy because the rule condition and action pre-condition may prevent action execution and thus break the
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cycle. Therefore, a cycle in a trigger graph is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a policy cycle.
P : policy: {r1 , ..., rn}
E : edge set : initialized to {}
Event-Set(r) : set of events in post-condition of action of rule r
Event(r) : event of rule r
for each rule r in P
E = Event-Set (r);
for each event e in E
for each rule k in P
if Event(k) matches e
E = E (r, k);
end if
end for
end for
end for
Figure 5.9: Trigger Graph Construction Algorithm
The trigger graph is analyzed for cycles using a simple breadth-first search algorithm shown in figure
5.10. Cycles are reported by the policy compiler as warnings. For the policy in figure 5.7, the policy compiler
reports that rules R58 and R59 may have a possible cycle.
Similar to conflict detection with the unionsq operator, we consider the possibility of the system generating
the event that can cause a cycle. Therefore, we construct the trigger graph by checking if any of the events
listed with the unionsq operator triggers any other rule in the policy. An event with post-condition (e1 unionsq ... unionsq en)
triggers a rule with event x if
∨
i=1..n ei matches x.
5.4 Evaluation
For the static conflict detection algorithm (figure 5.4), the complexity of event matching is O(b) where b is the
average number of parameters of event terms. The complexity of matching two conditions is O(q2t) where q
is average number of predicates in the conditions and t is the average number of arguments in the predicates.
Since the inner loop iterates over each rule, the complexity of the inner loop is O(n(b+ q2t)) where n is the
number of rules in the policy. The consistency checking has O(nc) Prolog assertions where c is the average
number of predicates per post-condition. This is assuming the worst-case situation when all rules in the
policy conflict and therefore, all predicates in the post-conditions should be asserted. Checking consistency
requires O(de) queries to the Prolog reasoner, where d is the number of post-condition constraints and e is
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Algorithm: Cycle Detection
detectCycle(E: edge set)
pick (a,b) in E
enqueue(a)
mark a
while (q!= empty)
x = dequeue()
for all i such that (x,i) in E
if i is marked
warn about cycle
exit
enqueue(i)
mark i
end for
end while
Figure 5.10: Cycle Detection Algorithm
the average number of predicates per post-condition. Therefore, the complexity of consistency verification
is O(nc + de). We do not consider the complexity of Prolog queries and assume it to be O(1). Since the
outer loop iterates n times, the final complexity is O(n2(b + q2t) + n2c+ nde).
By similar analysis, the complexity of the dynamic conflict detection algorithm (figure 5.5) is found to
be O(n + n2c + nde). For the resolution algorithm (figure 5.6), the preferred method has a complexity of
O(m(q2t)) + O(k), where m is the number of resolution rules, q is the average number of predicates in the
post-condition of a resolution rule, t is the average number of terms per predicate and k is the number
of predicates in the condition part of a resolution rule. Assuming c to be the number of predicates per
post-condition of a policy rule and noting that the outer loop iterates over each rule in the conflict rule set,
the final complexity is O(pc(m(q2t) + k)), where p is the size of the conflict rule set.
Building the trigger graph (figure 5.9) has a worst-case complexity of O(n3), where n is the number of
rules, if every rule triggers every other rule. Given a graph, a cycle can be detected with a time complexity
of O(n+ e) where e is the number of edges [Tar72]. For a fully connected graph, e = n2 and therefore, cycle
detection has a complexity of O(n+n2) = O(n2). Therefore, the entire policy cycle detection algorithm has
a complexity of O(n3) +O(n2) = O(n3).
Figure 5.11 shows the overhead of conflict and cycle analysis. The policy compiler was executed on a
Pentium(M) 1.7 GHz machine with 1.0GB RAM. For a policy containing 400 rules, the compiler takes about
1 sec to perform the analyses.
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Figure 5.11: Conflict and Cycle Analysis Overhead
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented techniques to detect and resolve conflicts due to effects of actions using the
ECPAP rule framework. Static analysis cannot detect all conflicts since many conflicts occur due to runtime
system conditions. Therefore, our approach uses a combination of static and dynamic conflict analysis
techniques. Static conflicts are resolved by the policy designer while dynamic conflicts are resolved using a
resolution framework. This framework uses priorities to choose one rule from a set of conflict rules. We also
presented techniques to detect cycles in policies and presented algorithms for cycle analysis. The complexity
analysis revealed that the overhead from these algorithms is not very significant.
45
Chapter 6
Ordering Rule Enforcement
In this chapter, we present the rule ordering problem and our proposed solution. In a single situation,
multiple rules can get simultaneously triggered. The order of enforcement of the rules may determine the
final system state. In section 6.1, we present the rule ordering problem with an example. We discuss how
the ECPAP framework enables reasoning about rule ordering in section 6.2. In section 6.3, we present a
notion called enforcement semantics that dictates the way rules should be enforced when multiple rules are
simultaneously triggered. Section 6.4 describes ordered rule enforcement. We evaluate the algorithms in
section 6.5 and conclude in section 6.6.
6.1 The Rule Ordering Problem
A management policy evolves over time by addition and deletion of rules, rule modifications and policy
compositions. Policies authored by different administrators may be merged to form the final system man-
agement policy. These operations cause various problems such as conflicts and cycles that we discussed in the
previous chapter. Even in a policy without conflicts and cycles, multiple rules may be based on a common
event-condition and so may be triggered in the same situation. Since the management system enforces any
set of non-conflicting rules, all triggered rules are sequentially or concurrently enforced. The order in which
the management system enforces the rules can determine the system behavior.
Consider the policy shown in figure 6.1. Rule R61 restarts the active space (and its various services) if it
has stopped when a device enters the space. Rule R62 authorizes a device of role guest if it enters the space.
We have assigned roles to mobile devices to differentiate between devices of different kinds of users. Rule
R63 mounts a laptop’s file system onto the active space file system [Hes03] when the laptop is brought into
the active space and R64 unmounts it when the laptop leaves the space. The pre- and post-conditions of the
actions are shown italicized in braces, above and below each rule action in figure 6.2. When a guest user
with a laptop enters an active space that is not running, the location system generates an ObjectEnter event
that triggers rules R61, R62 and R63. A rule is said to be triggered when its event has been observed and its
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R61 : on (r61, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if (statusSpace(s) = = “stopped”)
do(restartSpace(s));
R62 : on (r62, ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
do(authorizeDevice(d, s));
R63 : on (r63, ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop” && roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
do (mountFileSystem(d, s));
R64 : on (r64, ObjectExit (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop”)
do(unmountFileSystem(d, s));
Figure 6.1: Policy to demonstrate the need for Rule Ordering
condition has been evaluated to true. A rule is said to be enforced when its action is executed. The order of
enforcement of the rules determines the behavior of the space. If R62 is executed before R61, authorization
fails since none of the services of the active space are running. Similarly, if R63 is enforced before R61,
mount operation fails since the active space file system is not running. But if R61 is enforced before R62
and R62 is enforced before R63, the active space successfully restarts the space, authorizes the device and
if successful, mounts the laptop’s file system. Therefore, when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered,
the order of enforcement of rules determines the final system state. A policy-based management system
must provide guarantees when multiple rules need to be concurrently enforced so that the system behavior
is predictable. Existing policy-based management systems based on ECA rules do not contain specifications
of actions required for reasoning and so do not provide guarantees which can lead to unpredictable system
states. Since ECPAP rules contain action specifications we can reason about rule ordering and provide
enforcement guarantees.
6.2 Analyzing Action Dependencies
When a set of rules is triggered, we determine the execution order of the rule actions by constructing a
workflow that expresses dependencies between different actions. The ECPAP framework enables analyzing
these dependencies. Figure 6.2 shows the policy in the ECPAP framework.
The pre- and post-conditions of actions are used to determine which action enables which other actions.
An action is said to enable another action if the post-condition of the former satisfies the pre-condition of
the latter. For example, in the policy in figure 6.2, when rules R61 and R62 are simultaneously triggered,
execution of the action of R61 brings the active space to the running state as indicated by the corresponding
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R61 : on (r61, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if (statusSpace(s) = = “stopped”)
{statusService(spaceRepository(s), not running}
do(restartSpace(s));
{statusSpace(s, running)}
R62 : on (r62, ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
{statusSpace(s, running)}
do(authorizeDevice(d, s));
{authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
R63 : on (r63, ObjectEnter (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop” && roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
{statusSpace(s, running) && authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
do (mountFileSystem(d, s));
{statusFileSystem(d, mounted)}
R64 : on (r64, ObjectExit (Device d, Space s))
if (deviceType(d) = = “laptop”)
{statusFileSystem(d, mounted)}
do(unmountFileSystem(d, s));
{statusFileSystem(d, unmounted)}
Figure 6.2: Policy of figure 6.1 in the ECPAP framework
post-condition. This satisfies the pre-condition of action of rule R62 and thus enables R62’s action. Therefore,
enforcing R61 before R62 successfully enforces both rules.
The workflow of rule actions is represented as a Boolean Interpreted Petri net (BIPN) [Rou94]. A Boolean
Interpreted Petri net is a Petri net [Rei85] whose transitions are assigned Boolean functions. A transition
can fire only when all of its input places are marked and its Boolean function evaluates to true. We assign
a place to each action and each transition is assigned the pre-condition of the action that is connected by a
directed edge from the transition as the Boolean function. The Petri net for the triggered rules (R61, R62
and R63) of figure 6.2 when the ObjectEnter event is received is shown in figure 6.3. The action of rule Ri
is represented as Ai.
Definition 6.1 : Formally, the BIPN of a set of actions A = {a1, ..., an} is a 1-safe marked Petri net
[Rou94] represented as a triple B = (P, T, F ), P = {place(a)|∀a ∈ A} ∪ {Start}, where place(a) is the place
representation of action a. T = {tK,pre(a) | ∀x ∈ K, tK,pre(a) ∈ x· ∧ place(a) ∈ tK,pre(a)· }, K is a set
of places and for x ∈ P ∪ T , ·x = {y | yFx} is called the input set of x and x·= {y | xFy} is called the
output set of x and the flow relation, F ⊆ (P ×T )∪ (T ×P ) such that dom(F )∪ codom(F ) = P ∪T . pre(a)
represents the pre-condition of action a.
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Figure 6.3: Petri net workflow for triggered rules of policy in figure 6.2
Petri net Workflow Construction
A Petri net workflow expresses dependencies between different actions and therefore, to construct a
workflow we analyze each pair of actions to determine if one enables the other. Pre-conditions of certain ac-
tions are satisfied by the current system state and therefore, these actions are called trivially-enabled actions.
Definition 6.2 : An action a is said to be trivially-enabled if the current state of the system, I, satisfies its
pre-condition. It is represented as I |= pre(a), where |= is the satisfies symbol.
Intuitively, trivially-enabled actions are independent of other actions and can be executed as the first set
of actions in the workflow. For example, the pre-condition in rule R61 is statusService(spaceRepository(s),
not running). spaceRepository(s) returns the identifier of an active space service called Space Repository
that contains information about applications and devices in the active space. If the space repository is not
running, it implies that there are currently no running applications in the active space and so it is safe to
restart the space. If the active space is not running, the pre-condition evaluates to true and therefore, A61
can be executed independent of A62 and A63. The algorithm to determine trivially-enabled actions is shown
in figure 6.4.
V = {} : set of trivially-enabled actions
A : set of actions of triggered rules
for each action a in A
if pre(a) evaluates to true
V = V ∪ a
Figure 6.4: Algorithm for trivially-enabled action analysis
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Enable(a) = {} : set of actions enabled by action a
V : set of trivially-enabled actions from algorithm 6.4
A : set of actions of triggered rules
for each action a ∈ A
for each action b ∈ A-V
if post(a) |= pre(b)
Enable(a) = Enable(a) ∪ b
Figure 6.5: Enablement Analysis
Once trivially-enabled actions have been identified, we check to see which action enables which other
actions through enablement analysis.
Definition 6.3: An action a1 is said to enable action a2 if post(a1) |= pre(a2) where post(a1) represents the
post-condition of action a1 and a2 is not trivially-enabled. This implies that execution of a1 would satisfy the
pre-condition of a2 and so a2 can be executed after a1. Since trivially-enabled actions are already enabled
by current system state, we do not check to see if any actions enable them. The algorithm for enablement
analysis is shown in figure 6.5. This algorithm determines that executing A61 enables A62.
Post-conditions of some actions may satisfy part of the pre-condition of another action. For example,
post-condition of A61 - statusSpace(s, running) satisfies a conjunct of the pre-condition of A63. Similarly,
post-condition of A62 satisfies a part of the pre-condition of A63. Therefore, A61 and A62 must be executed
to enable A63. We say that each action A61 and A62 partially-enables A63. The variables s and d in pred-
icates statusSpace(s, running) and authorizationStatus(d, authorized) are bound to values of the active
space and device during evaluation, respectively, and thus form propositions whose satisfiability checks are
decidable.
Definition 6.4: An action a1 is said to partially-enable action a2 if post(a1) |= partial − pre(a2), where
partial− pre(a2) is a conjunction of some proper subset of conjuncts of pre(a2). A set of partially-enabling
actions of an action a that together enable a is called a partial-set of a. An action may have multiple partial-
sets and therefore, the set of all partial-sets of a is denoted by partial − sets(a). In the above example,
partial − sets(A63) = {A61, A62}. The algorithm in figure 6.6 determines the partial-sets.
The algorithm determines the set of actions that collectively enable every non-trivially-enabled action,
a. If the set contains only one action, then it implies that a single action enables a and therefore, is already
determined by the enablement analysis in figure 6.5. Therefore, the algorithm in figure 6.6 only considers
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Partial-sets(a) = {} : set of partial-sets of action a
A : set of actions of triggered rules
V : set of trivially-enabled actions
S : temporary set
for each action a ∈ A-V
S = {}
for each action b ∈ A-{a}
if b partially-enables a
S = S ∪ b
end for
for each subset s of S
if (cardinality(s) ≥ 2)
p = true
for each action c
p = p ∧ post(c)
if p |= pre(a)
Partial-sets(a) = Partial-sets(a) ∪ s
end if
end for
end if
end for
end for
Figure 6.6: Partial-sets Determination
sets having more than one element. In addition, the algorithm does not test an action with itself as this
might lead to a deadlock.
Though the algorithm for partial-enablement analysis can replace enablement analysis algorithm of figure
6.5, we separate the two algorithms since partial-enablement analysis has a much higher complexity as
detailed in section 6.5.
Once we determine the partial-sets, we construct the workflow as a Petri net using algorithm in figure
6.7. The Petri net is represented as an adjacency set of places and transitions.
This algorithm constructs a BIPN using the results from algorithms in figures 6.4 - 6.6. It initializes
the Petri net by assigning a place to every action. The Start place is connected to each place representing
trivially-enabled actions through a transition with the true Boolean function. We assign the Boolean function
true to the transition since the pre-condition of all trivially-enabled actions evaluate to true. For each action
a enabling action b, a transition is created with the Boolean function pre(b) that connects place(a) to
place(b). Finally, for every set of actions s enabling an action a, a transition with Boolean function pre(a)
is created that connects places representing actions in s to place(a).
The Petri net generated from algorithm 6.7 for action set A is represented as B = (P, T, F ) where
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A : set of actions of triggered rules
V : set of trivially-enabled actions
Enable(a) : set of actions enabled by action a
Partial-sets(a) : set of all partial-sets of action a
P = {Start} : set of Petri net Places initialized to Place called Start
T = {} : set of Petri net Transitions
place(a) : Place for action a
adj(x) : adjacency set of x, x ∈ P ∪ T
trans(p, f) : Transition with function f connected by edges from places in set p
for each action a ∈ A
P = P ∪ place(a)
t = trans({Start}, true)
adj(Start) = adj(Start) ∪ t
T = T ∪ t
for each action a ∈ V //trivially-enabled actions
adj(t) = adj(t) ∪ place(a)
for each action a ∈ A //enable
for each action b ∈ Enable(a)
t = trans({place(a)}, pre(b))
if t /∈ T
T = T ∪ t
adj(place(a)) = adj(place(a)) ∪ t
end if
adj(t) = adj(t) ∪ place(b)
end for
end for
for each action a ∈ A-V //partially-enable
for each set s ∈ Partial-sets(a)
t = trans(s, pre(a))
T = T ∪ t
adj(t) = adj(t) ∪ place(a)
for each action b ∈ s
adj(place(b)) = adj(place(b)) ∪ t
end for
end for
Figure 6.7: Petri net Workflow Construction
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P = {place(a)|∀a ∈ A} ∪ {Start}
T = {ti,j |(i = {Start}, j = true) ∧ (i = {place(a)}, j = pre(b)|∀a, b ∈ A, (post(a) |= pre(b)) ∧ (pre(b) 6|=
true)) ∧ (i = s, j = pre(b)|∀b ∈ A, (∀s ∈ 2P−{Start},
∧
∀k∈s post(action(k))) |= pre(b))}, action(k) represents
the action in set A assigned to place k.
F = {(x, y)|∀ti,j ∈ T, ∀x ∈ i, y = ti,j} ∪ {(x, y)|∀ti,j ∈ T, (x = ti,j ∧ y = place(k), ∀k ∈ A|j = pre(k))}
The three conjuncts in the definition of T correspond to the transitions resulting from algorithms 6.4 -
6.6. The transitions are labeled ti,j where i =· ti,j and j is the assigned Boolean function. The flow relation,
F , represents the various edges of the Petri net.
Theorem 6.1: For a set of actions A = {a1, ..., an}, the Petri net generated by algorithm 6.7 enables
maximum number of actions starting from the current system state I.
Proof: To prove the above theorem, it is sufficient to prove that for every action a ∈ A, if I ⇒k a, then
there is a reachable path [Rei85] in the Petri net from the Start place to place(a), where I ⇒k a means that
starting from the current system state I, successful execution of k actions of A enables a. X → a1 implies
execution of all actions of set X enables a1.
We prove this by structural induction on the Petri net.
Basis: I ⇒0 a
pre(a) is satisfied by current system state and so a is trivially-enabled by trivially-enabled analysis algo-
rithm from figure 6.4. Therefore, t{Start},true ∈ T and {(Start, t{Start},true), (t{Start},true, place(a))} ⊆ F .
Therefore, there is a reachable path from S to place(a) through the transition labeled t{Start},true.
Hypothesis: Assume if I ⇒k a there is a reachable path from Start to place(a). We need to prove that if
I ⇒k+1 a1 there exists a reachable path from Start to place(a1).
Since I ⇒k a from our inductive hypothesis, there is a set of actions A
′ ⊂ A such that ∀x ∈ A′, I ⇒l≤k x
and A′ → a1. Therefore, there is a reachable path from Start to place(x) for all x ∈ A
′. There are two cases
to consider.
Case 1: A′ = {a}
Since a is found to enable a1 from enablement analysis in algorithm from figure 6.5, t{place(a)},pre(a1) ∈ T
and {(place(a), t{place(a)},pre(a1)), (t{place(a)},pre(a1), place(a1))} ⊂ F . Therefore, there is a reachable path
from place(a) to place(a1) and since by hypothesis there exists a reachable path from Start to place(a), by
transitivity, there is a reachable path from Start to place(a1).
Case 2: Cardinality(A′) > 1
Actions in A′ are found to enable a1 from partial-enablement analysis in algorithm from figure 6.6. Therefore,
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t{place(x)|∀x∈A′},pre(a1) ∈ T and {(place(a)|∀a ∈ A
′, t{place(x)|∀x∈A′},pre(a1)), (t{place(x)|∀x∈A′},pre(a1), place(a1))}
⊂ F . Therefore, there is a reachable path from place(x), ∀x ∈ A′ to place(a1) through the transition
t{place(x)|∀x∈A′},pre(a1). Since there is a reachable path from Start to place(x), ∀x ∈ A
′ from our hypothesis,
by transitivity, there is a reachable path from Start to place(a1). 2
Post-conditions with choice operators are treated as follows:
(p1 unionsq ... unionsq pn) |= p1 ∨ ... ∨ pn
A choice-expression satisfies any of the individual predicates in its choice-set. We adopt a liberal view in
order to ensure progress of action executions. For example, (statusLight(on) unionsq statusLight(off)) satisfies
both statusLight(on) and statusLight(off) predicates. Since the light can be in either the on state or in the
off state but not in both, an action with the former post-condition satisfies actions with either of the latter
pre-conditions. If the former action turns light off, it still enables an action that requires the light to be
on. But since we use a Boolean Interpreted Petri net, the Boolean function associated with the transition
ensures that the second action does not get executed.
(p1 unionsq ... unionsq pn) 6|= p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn
The above is trivially true by the definition of the unionsq operator. The system can be in one of the states in the
choice-set.
(p1 unionsq ... unionsq pn) |= (p1 unionsq ... unionsq pn)
An choice-expression satisfies itself since there is a probability of an action reaching a state that enables
an action with a matching pre-condition. If the post-condition and pre-condition do not match, the Boolean
function associated with the transition corresponding to the latter will not be satisfied, at runtime, and so
the action is not executed.
6.3 Enforcement Semantics
An active space is managed by multiple policies, each designed for different aspects of the system. When they
are loaded into the management system, rules from different policies may be triggered in a single situation.
Since rules are created independent of rules in other policies, it would be desirable to have all rules successfully
enforced. It would be unintuitive to a user if a rule failed to execute due to the triggering of a rule from
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a different policy. As demonstrated in the previous section, order of enforcement of rules determines if a
rule action successfully executes. Therefore, we define a notion called enforcement semantics that provides
certain guarantees about rule enforcement. Enforcement semantics of a policy-based management system
dictates the way rules are to be enforced when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered. Since our goal
is to successfully execute as many rules as possible, we call the enforcement semantics of our management
system as maximum rule enforcement semantics. This semantics guarantees that the management system
enforces rules in an order that ensures as many rules are successfully enforced as possible, provided no other
errors cause rule enforcement to fail.
Once dependencies among triggered rule actions have been determined, the enforcement semantics of the
adaptation system specifies the execution order of actions. We have identified three different enforcement
semantics for policy-based adaptation systems.
Random: This semantics executes rule actions in a random order. Most policy systems follow this
semantics, implicitly, since they do not reason about ordering multiple triggered rules. This is the weakest
of all three semantics and does not require the action workflow to be constructed. This semantics can be
used when dependency among rule actions is low and very few rules are triggered by a single change.
All-or-none: The all-or-none semantics specifies that the rule actions in the workflow must be executed
only if all actions can eventually execute. This implies that even if one action in the workflow cannot be
enabled then the entire workflow should be discarded. In order to enforce this semantics, the BIPN workflow
is analyzed to see if all places can be reached using a reachability algorithm [Rei85]. The all-or-none semantics
provides the strongest guarantee and is useful in policies that have high dependency among rule actions.
Maximum Rule: The maximum rule semantics guarantees that the management system enforces rules
in an order that ensures as many rules are successfully enforced as possible, provided no other errors cause
rule enforcement to fail. The difference between all-or-none and maximum rule enforcement semantics is
that in the latter if any place in the workflow can be reached from the Start place it will be executed. If
a place cannot be reached, the workflow is not discarded as in the all-or-none semantics. The active space
management system uses the maximum rule enforcement semantics.
6.4 Petri net Workflow Execution
Once the workflow is constructed, the actions are executed using our Petri net workflow execution engine.
The engine analyzes the Petri net for any deadlocks using the deadlock detection algorithm described in
[Rei85]. If a deadlock is found, the execution engine does not execute any action in the workflow. Currently,
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we do not resolve deadlocks and abandon the workflow. If the Petri net is deadlock-free, the engine uses
a simple Petri net traversal algorithm to traverse the net and execute actions. The workflow execution
algorithm is shown in figure 6.4. The transition states of the Petri net act as synchronization points in the
workflow. When multiple places lead to a single transition, the engine waits for the completion of all actions
in the places before executing actions of places leading out of the transition. At each transition, the engine
verifies the Boolean function for satisfaction before executing the following action.
6.5 Evaluation
Trivially-enabled action analysis (figure 6.4) has a linear complexity of O(n) pre-condition checks for n
actions. Enablement analysis (figure 6.5) does a pair-wise satisfiability check of actions and therefore, has
a quadratic complexity of O(n2). Partial-enablement analysis (figure 6.6) analyzes for each action if it is
enabled by a set of actions. Each action subset must be determined and this has an exponential complexity
of O(2n). Since each subset is tested to see if it enables an action, for all actions, the final complexity is
O(n22n). Currently, partial sets determination algorithm has a very high complexity but there are various
optimizations that can be performed to reduce the value of n. For example, the enablement analysis algorithm
reduces the number of rules to be verified during partial-enablement analysis. Since enablement analysis
has a quadratic complexity, the overall performance overhead is greatly reduced. In addition, the number
of rules that are normally triggered on a single event is quite less (less than 5 rules per event in our active
space policy) and so the overhead is tolerable. Finally, the Petri net workflow generation algorithm (figure
6.7) has a worst-case complexity of O(n22n) since it uses results from partial-enablement analysis algorithm
and so is bounded by the latter’s complexity.
The performance overhead of Petri net workflow generation is shown in figure 6.9. The management
system was executed on a Pentium(M) 1.7GHz machine with 1.0GB RAM. Figure 6.9(a) shows the overhead
with varying number of triggered rules. The test policy had multiple instances of the same rule since the
focus was on testing the overhead of the system. As predicted from the algorithmic complexity described
above, the overhead is exponential with the number of triggered rules. For 15 triggered rules the overhead
was found to be around 3 seconds. Normally, for a typical policy, the number of rules triggered on a single
event can be expected to be much less than 15 and so the approach is feasible.
The number of predicates in pre- and post-conditions of actions influences the Petri net generation
overhead. Therefore, we measured the overhead with varying number of predicates in action specifications.
Figure 6.9(b) illustrates the performance overhead of the system. The x-axis indicates the average number
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in(x) : set of incoming transitions/places of place/transition x
out(x) : set of outgoing transitions/places of place/transition x
post(a) : post-condition of action a
action(p) : action of place p
bf(t) : Boolean function of transition t
create(x, tok) : create execution thread for transition/place x and assign token tok
send(x, tok) : send token tok to transition/place x
recvToken(x) : receive token from transitions/place x
begin //workflow execution
create(Start, regular) //assign regular token to Start place
executePlace(Start)
end
executePlace(p)
tok = token(p)
//execute action
execute action(p)
for all trans in out(p)
if trans exists
send(trans, tok)
else
create(trans, tok)
executeTransition(trans)
end if
end for
end
executeTransition(trans)
tok = token(trans)
wait for all p in in(trans) to send tokens
t = recvToken(p)
end wait
//check for Boolean function satisfaction
if bf(t) != true
exit
end if
for all p in out(trans)
if p exists
send(p, tok)
else
create(p, tok)
executePlace(p)
end if
end for
end
Figure 6.8: Workflow Execution Algorithm
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Figure 6.9: Petri net Workflow Generation Overhead (a) Overhead vs. Number of Triggered Rules (b)
Overhead vs. Average Number of Predicates
of predicates for each pre- and post-condition. The y-axis shows the overhead in milliseconds. The overhead
is less than linear though the curve appears exponential in the graph due to the exponential increase in the
values of x-axis.
6.6 Conclusion
Existing policy-based systems enforce rules as they are triggered. When multiple rules are triggered in a single
situation, these systems enforce rules in a random order, generally depending on the order of evaluation of the
rules. We demonstrated in this chapter that the order of rule enforcement can determine the system behavior
and therefore, randomly enforcing simultaneously triggered rules leads to unpredictable behavior. Using the
ECPAP framework, we proposed approaches to determine dependencies among triggered rule actions by
analyzing their pre- and post-conditions. This analysis generates a graph that captures dependencies among
rule actions.
We proposed a new notion called enforcement semantics that determines how simultaneously triggered
rules should be enforced and identified three different semantics that can be used in management systems. We
have found the maximum rule enforcement semantics to be suitable in our active spaces. Though the initial
evaluation of the semantics was encouraging more empirical evaluations should be performed to determine
the efficacy of the proposed semantics.
We evaluated the performance overhead of the analysis algorithms and found one of the algorithms to
have exponential complexity in the number of rules that are analyzed. For active spaces, we found that the
number of triggered rules in a given situation is generally small and the overhead is negligible. But in large
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enterprise systems, this overhead can be significant and so we propose model-based optimization techniques
to reduce this overhead. We discuss this approach in chapter 13.
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Chapter 7
Policies with Long-running Actions
In this chapter, we discuss the applicability of the ECPAP model for reasoning about rules with long-running
actions. In section 7.1, we present our definition of long-running actions with examples. We discuss the
policy problems caused by rules with long-running actions and show the shortcomings of expressing these
rules with ECA framework. In section 7.2, we extend the ECPAP framework for representing rules with
long-running actions. Section 7.3 presents techniques for conflict analysis with this kind of rules. We discuss
the use of state models for reasoning about long-running actions in section 7.4. The chapter concludes with
an evaluation of the approach.
7.1 Long-running Actions
Actions of certain rules execute throughout the running time of the system or for a significantly long time.
These actions include actions that initiate heartbeat signals in devices, maintain certain quality-of-service,
force entities to be present in certain states for an indefinite period of time and so on. It is not possible
to describe these actions using Hoare logic since that requires the action to complete execution before the
post-condition can be satisfied [Hoa69]. Therefore, we describe these actions using behavioral specifications
using temporal logic expressions.
The semantics of the ECPAP rule (e, c, p)→ (a, s) is modified slightly as follows:
occ(e) ∧ c ∧ p→ exec(a)
exec(a)→ s
where exec(a) is the initiation of the execution of action a. The temporal expression s holds immediately
after the initiation of the action a. Some example rules with long-running actions are shown below:
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R71: on(r71, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(true)
{true}
do(InitiateHeartbeats(d, 50));
{ 2 (occ(TimerEvent) → ((CurrentTime - hbeatRecvTime) < 50)) ∧ 2 (statusDevice(d, running))}
R71 initiates heartbeats with an interval of 50 time units on a device that is brought into an active space.
The post-condition describes that, henceforth a heartbeat is observed within every 50 time units and that
the device is always in running state.
7.2 Temporal Logic Description of Long-running Actions
We use simple temporal logic representations to describe the behavior of long-running actions. Currently,
we support the henceforth and eventually temporal operators [MP92]. The henceforth operator, represented
as 2p, describes that the predicate p is always satisfied in future. The eventually operator, represented as
3p, describes that after a finite number of (possibly 0) steps p becomes true.
The syntax of the post-condition is extended to p1 (&&/||pk)
k=2..m, where each pi is a first-order predicate
of the form Q1t1...Qntn Mpred(t1, ..., tn): Qi is an optional quantifier, M is a temporal operator from the
set {2, 3} and each ti is a constant or a variable. The keywords .henceforth. and .eventually. are supported
in the post-condition expressions.
In order to support timed temporal operations, we have extended the operators to have timing constraints.
These constraints specify the time in milliseconds that the operators will be applicable. For example, 2t<6p,
describes that p will be satisfied for a period of 6 milliseconds. Similarly, 3t<6p describes that within 6
milliseconds p will be satisfied. A typical behavioral specification of an action to turn a heating device on
would be
{true}
startHeater();
{.henceforth.(1000000) statusDevice("Heater", "on") && .eventually.(7000) exceed("temperature", 65)}
This specification describes that the device Heater will be in on state for a period of 1000 seconds and
within 7 seconds the temperature will exceed 65 units.
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R72: on(r72, ObjectEnter(Device d))
if(true)
{true}
do(InitiateHeartbeats(d, 50));
{ 2 (occ(TimerEvent) → ((CurrentTime - hbeatRecvTime) < 50)) ∧ 2 (statusDevice(d, running))}
R73 : on(r73, PowerlowEvent(Device d))
if(true)
{true}
do(hibernateDevice(d));
{statusDevice(d, suspended)}
Figure 7.1: Policy with Conflicting Long-running Actions
7.3 Conflict Analysis
The ECPAP framework enables conflict analysis of policies with long-running actions. Long-running actions
may affect rules that are fired in a different situation, in future, and therefore, the action constraint approach
[CLN00] cannot be used to detect conflicts. Since the ECPAP framework can also describe the behavior of
the action, the future effect of the action can be determined and can be used for conflict detection.
For example, consider the policy shown in figure 7.1. R72 initiates heartbeats on a device while R73
hibernates a device if the battery power goes below a certain threshold. The actions of the two rules conflict
with each other since a hibernated device cannot send heartbeats. The rules are triggered on different events
and therefore, traditional conflict detection techniques would fail to detect this conflict.
With the ECPAP framework, we use state models to store the state of the system as temporal logic
expressions. A state model represents a system state as a set of predicates. This set is stored in a database
that is updated periodically by polling and by system events. We have implemented the state model as a
database with the schema – < operator, time, predicate >. An example record in the database would be
– < .henceforth., 3000, statusDevice(d, running) >.
When a rule with a long-running action is enforced, the post-condition of the action is added to the state-
model. The state-model supports ageing and garbage-collects predicates that have expired. The predicates
in the state model are also used to monitor the action. Enforcement monitoring is discussed in detail in
chapter 8.
When a rule is triggered, the predicate in the state model is used with the post-condition of the action
to check for satisfiability of the post-condition constraint. The algorithm for conflict analysis is shown in
figure 7.2.
This algorithm extends algorithm in figure 5.5 by including persistent state predicates from the state-
model while checking any violations of post-condition constraints.
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PC – post-condition constraint set
AS – Activation Set
S – state model
K := {}
for each rule r in AS
K := K ∪ post(r)
end for
for each predicate s in S
K := K ∪ s
end for
if (K U PC) is not consistent
resolve conflict
Figure 7.2: Algorithm for Dynamic Conflict Detection with Persistent State Predicates
7.4 State Model
The state model is a repository of configuration and behavioral information of various system components.
The configuration information is stored as key-value pairs while the behavioral information is stored as
temporal predicates. Currently, the model supports henceforth and eventually temporal operators.
7.4.1 Model Updation
The state model is updated by different components of the system. The enforcement verification system
adds temporal predicates to the model; events from the system update the configuration information and
the garbage collector checks for the validity of the temporal predicates and removes expired ones.
7.4.2 Garbage Collection
A garbage collector runs periodically checking for expired temporal predicates and purges them out. The
garbage collector runs every 5 seconds and checks for the validity of each predicate. Once a predicate is
removed from the state model, it is no longer monitored by the enforcement monitoring system.
7.5 Evaluation
Figure 7.3 shows the response times of the state model for query and garbage collection. Performance of
queries is important since the model is queried during conflict analysis and therefore, contributes to the
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Figure 7.3: State Model Response Times
overall response time of the management system. On a Pentium(M) 1.7GHz system with 1.0GB RAM, the
state model takes about 60ms for querying a model of 7000 predicates.
Garbage collection has a very low overhead. We found that to verify 7000 predicates the garbage collector
takes about 5ms.
7.6 Conclusion
Long-running actions can affect the management process by conflicting with rules that are fired in a future
situation. Axiomatic specifications describe the state of the system after an action completes execution and
therefore, cannot describe long-running actions accurately. In this chapter, we extended the ECPAP frame-
work to describe actions using temporal logic operators. This extension enables complex conflict analysis
using state models. Behavioral description is also used in the next chapter for monitoring enforcement of
rules with long-running actions.
The current framework only supports henceforth and eventually temporal operators. It can easily be
extended with more operators for better action description and analysis.
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Chapter 8
Enforcement Monitoring and Policy
Exception Model
In this chapter, we present an exception model for policies that handles rule enforcement failures. Section 8.1
discusses policy errors. Section 8.2 presents our exception model. Verification and monitoring systems are
discussed in sections 8.3 and 8.4. The exception generation system is discussed in section 8.5. We describe
how exceptions are handled with ordered rule enforcement in section 8.6 and conclude with a brief summary.
8.1 Policy Errors
Policies, like program code, can have various errors that affect system management. These errors can occur
due to wrong mapping of event-conditions with actions, failure of system components and buggy action
code. Policy errors can lead the system to undesirable states and severely affect the functioning of the
various system components.
Management policies separate the specification of situation-action pairs from their implementations. A
policy rule describes the action that needs to be executed on a specific event-condition. The sensing of the
situation and the execution of the action is implemented by the management system enforcing the policy.
Therefore, a policy defines a different abstraction level. An administrator, who authors a policy, need not
be concerned about the enforcement of the policy and can focus completely on describing the organization
guidelines in the ECPAP framework.
Every abstraction level requires its own exception model to handle errors at that level. For example, ma-
chine level programs have exception models based on processor interrupts, programming languages support
exception models using continuations [FHW01], some databases use triggers to handle exceptions and so on.
Different exception models are required at different levels since the exception handlers of lower abstraction
levels may not adequately handle exceptions at higher levels. For example, programming language exceptions
cannot be handled by processor interrupt handlers since programmers may not have knowledge of the
processor interruption generation and may not be able to modify interrupt handler code. Therefore, the
abstraction level defined by policies also necessitates an exception model since exception handlers of actions
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may not handle policy exceptions appropriately. For instance, if a rule action fails, the internal exception
handler of the action may log the exception, while the administrator would want to enforce an alternative
action.
Bettini et al. [BJWW02] propose an approach for monitoring obligation policy enforcement. Obligation
policies in their work focuses mainly on message transfers. They adopt an approach in which the monitoring
system verifies the presence of a receive message for every send message in the message logs. Actions in
active spaces can range from simple atomic actions to complex long-running actions. Therefore, the approach
proposed in [BJWW02] would not suffice and more complex monitoring approaches have to be employed.
8.2 Policy Exception Model
Our management system provides an exception model for policies based on program verification techniques.
Once a rule action is executed, the post-condition of the action is tested to see if it is true. If the post-
condition is false, the verification system generates events that denote the exception. These events, called
exception events, are similar to regular system events except that they are generated by the verification
system and contain the enforcement context as one of their parameters.
The policy enforcement system exhibits an iterative control behavior - if action of one rule triggers another
rule, action of the former rule is completed before that of the latter rule is initiated. The size of the control
context remains constant. The context of the failure contains only the rule that failed and is independent
of other rules that could have triggered the failed rule. This is in contrast to exception models of some
programming languages such as C++ and Java that exhibit recursive control behavior. When an exception
occurs, the control context contains the call stack and this necessitates propagation of exception across the
stack. An iterative behavior obviates the need for propagating exceptions and this simplifies the exception
model. Our policy exception model defines an exception state as a situation in which the post-condition of
an executed rule action is not satisfied.
Definition 8.1: A policy exception, e, is a triple, (N,R,C) where N is the exception name, R is a set of
exception parameters and C is a set of arguments containing the enforcement context of the failed rule.
An exception handler is designed as an ECPAP rule and is part of the management policy. In the policy
in figure 8.1, rules R84 and R85 are exception handler rules. When an action fails, the verification system
detects the failure and generates exception events. These events trigger exception handler rules, similar
to system events triggering management rules. The exception handling system consists of the verification,
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R81 : on(r81, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if(statusSpace(s) == “stopped”)
{statusService(spaceRepository(s), not running)}
do(restartSpace(s));
{statusSpace(s, running)}
R82 : on(r82, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if(roleDevice(d) == “guest”)
{statusSpace(s, running)}
do(AutoAuthorizeDeviceAndInitiateHBeats(d, s));
{authorizationStatus(d, authorized) && heartbeatStatus(d, started)}
R83 : on(r83, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if(deviceType(d) = = “laptop” && roleDevice(d) = = “guest”)
{statusSpace(s, running) && authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
do(mountFileSystem(d, s));
{statusFileSystem(d, mounted)}
R84 : on(e1, authorizationFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(roleDevice(d) = = “guest” && rc.id != “e1”)
{true}
do(PasswordAuthorizeDevice(d));
{authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
R85 : on(e2, heartbeatStartFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(rc.id != “e2”) //avoids loop
{authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
do(InitiateHeartbeats(d, 100));
{heartbeatStatus(d, started)}
Figure 8.1: Example policy with exception rules
monitoring and exception generation systems.
8.3 Verification System
The verification system checks if the post-condition of an action is true after the action completes exe-
cution. Since the post-condition is an expression containing propositions, some or all of the propositions
may be false. The verification system determines the failed propositions and forwards them to the excep-
tion generation system along with the enforcement context of the failed rule. The verification algorithm is
shown in figure 8.2. This algorithm verifies if each proposition of a post-condition expression is satisfied.
If a proposition is false, it is added to the FailedProps set. The set is finally forwarded to the excep-
tion generation system that maps the propositions to exceptions. For example, in the policy in figure 8.1,
when a “guest” laptop is brought into the active space, myspace, that is running, rule R2 is triggered and
enforced. This causes the action AutoAuthorizeDeviceAndInitiateHBeats(#laptop,#myspace) to be ex-
ecuted. Note that #laptop and #myspace are used to indicate the argument values and do not represent
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post(a) : post-condition expression of action a expressed in propositional logic
FailedProps = {} : set of failed propositions
props(k) : set of propositions of a propositional expression, k
for each proposition x ∈ props(post(a))
if x is false
FailedProps = FailedProps ∪ x
if FailedProps != {}
send FailedProps to exception generation system
Figure 8.2: Verification Algorithm
the actual arguments. Upon completion of the action, the post-condition is verified. Since authorization
of the device should be successful before heartbeats can be initiated, if authorization fails, both propo-
sitions authorizationStatus(#laptop, authorized) and heartbeatStatus(#laptop, started) are false. These
propositions are sent to the exception generation system.
Expressions with the choice operator are evaluated as disjunctions. For example, an choice-expression
(valueOf(x, 1)unionsqvalueOf(x, 2)) is evaluated as (valueOf(x, 1)∨valueOf(x, 2)). This approach of verification
cannot detect exceptions if the choice-expression lists all possible states that can be reached, since the system
is always in one of the states regardless of success or failure of action execution. In such situations, the choice-
expression should be modified to capture some behavioral aspects of the action. For example, consider the
action
{true}
toggleLightState();
{(statusLight(on) unionsq statusLight(off))}
Since the status of the light is always on or off, failure of the toggleLightState action cannot be detected.
The action post-condition should then contain some more information that lists the state of the light before
the action was executed.
{((previousStatusLight(on) ∧ statusLight(off)) unionsq (previousStatusLight(off) ∧ statusLight(on)))}
8.4 Monitoring System
The monitoring system is used to monitor long-running actions by checking the satisfaction of temporal
logic expressions in the action post-condition. When a temporal logic expression is added to the active space
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state model, the monitoring system interprets the expression and creates monitors that periodically verify
the expression.
Henceforth expressions are monitored by periodic verification of the expression. The polling rate is
system dependent and is of the order of a few seconds in our active spaces. If the expression is false, the
enforcement system concludes that as an exception.
Eventually expressions are monitored by periodic verification but once the predicate is satisfied monitor-
ing is terminated. For example, the expression .eventually.(7000)exceed(“temperature”, 65) is monitored
by periodic polling for 7 seconds till the exceed(“temperature”, 65) is satisfied. Once this predicate becomes
true, monitoring is terminated.
Bounded-temporal expressions are monitored for the period specified in the bound. Once the predicate
expires, it is automatically removed by the garbage collector. The garbage collector notifies the monitoring
thread about the expiry of the expression. If the thread is monitoring a .henceforth. expression, it simply
terminates. If the expression is an .eventually. expression and is not satisfied, the predicate is assumed to
have failed. In the above example, if the temperature of the heater does not reach 65 units before 7 seconds,
the action startHeater is assumed to have failed and appropriate exception events are generated.
8.5 Exception Generation System
The exception generation system contains a map of predicates to exceptions. For example,
authorizationStatus(#laptop, authorized) and heartbeatStatus(#laptop, started) are mapped to excep-
tions authorizationFailed(Device d) and heartbeatStartFailed(Device d), respectively. The exception gen-
eration system further appends the rule context as a parameter to the exceptions and creates exception events.
In the above example, the exception events authorizationFailed(#laptop, rc) and
heartbeatStartFailed(#laptop, rc) are generated where the rule context rc contains the identifier of the
failed rule - r2, event name - ObjectEnter and event parameters – #laptop,#myspace. A partial map of
predicates to exceptions is shown in figure 8.3. Mappings can be added and removed dynamically through
a user interface to the management system.
8.6 Handling Exceptions with Ordered Rule Enforcement
In chapter 6, we showed how the ECPAP framework can be used to analyze dependencies among multiple
triggered rule actions and construct a Boolean Interpreted Petri net (BIPN) workflow. This Petri net
represents dependencies and facilitates enforcement of rules according to some semantics. The workflow for
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Figure 8.3: Predicates to Exceptions Mapping Interface
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Figure 8.4: Petri net Workflow for Triggered Rules of Policy in figure 8.1
the example in figure 8.1 when rules R81, R82 and R83 are triggered is shown in figure 8.4. Place Ai contains
the action of rule Ri. The pre-condition of action of A81 is satisfied by current system state as the space
repository service will not be running in an active space that has stopped. Post-condition of action of A81
- statusSpace(s, running) satisfies the pre-condition of action of A82 and therefore, action of A82 can be
executed after that of A81. Once actions of A81 and A82 are executed, the pre-condition of action of A83 is
satisfied and so it can be executed.
8.6.1 Workflow Execution
The workflow execution algorithm extends the algorithm presented in figure 6.8 by adding two kinds of tokens
– regular and exception. A place generates a regular token when action associated with the place successfully
completes execution. The place generates an exception token when its action fails during execution. When a
transition receives an exception token, it indicates that a preceding place in the Petri net workflow generated
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an exception. Since all places that follow this transition in the Petri net need to be notified of this exception,
the transition immediately fires and propagates the exception token to all connected places. The algorithm
is shown in figure 8.5.
Similarly, when a place receives a regular token, it executes the corresponding action, since its reception
indicates that at least along one path from the Start place in the Petri net all actions have been successfully
executed. But when an exception token is received by a place, it waits for all incoming transitions to notify
exceptions before forwarding the exception. For example, the token passing sequence when action A82 fails
is shown in figure 8.6. The Start place of the Petri net is initialized with a regular token. This token is
forwarded to place A81. The action in the place is executed and verified. Since the action was successful, a
regular token is generated and forwarded to place A82. Action of A82 is executed and verified. Since it fails,
an exception token is generated and forwarded to A83. On receiving the exception token, the action of A83
is not executed and the workflow execution terminates.
Once all places in the Petri net have been marked with tokens, the net is analyzed to see if there were
any exceptions. Exception handlers are determined and the Petri net is reconstructed with the handler
actions and the unexecuted actions in the original Petri net. In our example, failure of action A82 generates
authorizationFailed(#laptop, rc) and heartbeatStartFailed(#laptop, rc) exception events that trigger rules
R84 and R85 in the policy. Action A83 in the original Petri net was unexecuted. So the Petri net is
reconstructed with actions of rules R84 and R85 (actions of A84 and A85 ) and the unexecuted action A83.
The workflow is reconstructed using the algorithms mentioned in the previous section. The reconstructed
workflow is shown in figure 8.7. This workflow is executed again using the execution engine. Action A84
authorizes the device using password authentication and if successful, actions A85 and A83 concurrently start
device heartbeats and mount device file system, respectively. The actions may fail and generate exception
events and these are handled as above. Currently, we do not analyze the policy to determine if the exception
generation terminates, though an approach similar to policy cycle detection can be used.
8.7 Conclusion
Exceptions in policies occur due to several reasons such as mistakes in policy design, wrong parameters and
system errors. These exceptions should be detected and appropriate corrective actions must be taken for
effective policy-based management. Since policies expose a different abstraction level, an exception model
is required that enables a policy designer to provide corrective measures when policy enforcement fails.
Existing policy-based systems do not offer any means of detecting and handling policy exceptions.
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in(x) : set of incoming transitions/places of place/transition x
out(x) : set of outgoing transitions/places of place/transition x
post(a) : post-condition of action a
action(p) : action of place p
create(x, tok) : create execution thread for transition/place x and assign token tok
send(x, tok) : send token tok to transition/place x
recvToken(x) : receive token from transitions/place x
begin //workflow execution
create(Start, regular) //assign regular token to Start place
executePlace(Start)
end
executePlace(p)
begin
tok = token(p)
if (tok = = exception)
wait for all trans in in(p) to send tokens
t = recvToken(trans)
if (t = = regular)
tok = regular
break
end if
end wait
end if
//execute action only if at least one token is a regular token
if (tok = = regular)
execute action(p)
verify post(action(p))
if exception
determine false predicates
tok = exception
endif
endif
for all trans in out(p)
if trans exists
send(trans, tok)
else
create(trans, tok)
executeTransition(trans)
end if
end
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executeTransition(trans)
begin
tok = token(trans)
if (tok= = regular)
wait for all p in in(trans) to send tokens
t = recvToken(p)
if (t = = exception)
tok = exception
break
end if
end wait
end if
for all p in out(trans)
if p exists
send(p, tok)
else
create(p, tok)
executePlace(p)
end if
end
Figure 8.5: Workflow Execution Algorithm
In this chapter, we proposed an exception detection and handling scheme using the ECPAP framework.
The post-condition of the action, available to the management system, enables verification of action execu-
tion. If the action fails, the post-condition predicates are used to generate exception events that contain the
context of the rule corresponding to the failed action. This method has been extended to monitor execution
of long-running actions using runtime monitoring techniques.
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Chapter 9
Towards deterministic policy-based
management
Event-Condition-Action framework leads to non-determinism and therefore, provides no guarantees about
the final system state that is reached when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered. This chapter dis-
cusses the non-determinism of the ECA framework in section 9.1. We prove that the ECPAP framework
leads to deterministic management in section 9.2. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the policy
requirements to enable deterministic management.
9.1 Non-determinism of the ECA framework
As discussed in the previous chapters, the ECA framework poses several problems for policy-based man-
agement. Its inability to detect conflicts and cycles, order multiple triggered rules and handle enforcement
failures leads to non-determinism. The rule evaluation process of an ECA-based management system can
be modeled as a non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA). When two or more rules are triggered, the
system enforces rules in a random order. Similarly, if enforcement fails, the system may reach an invalid
state. Cycles can cause non-termination of the enforcement process, which cannot be modeled as a finite
automaton.
Non-determinism leads to unpredictable states and can confuse the user. A management system should
exhibit deterministic behavior for effective management.
9.2 Formal Proof of Determinism
In this section, we formally prove that ECPAP framework enables deterministic management. We show how
the ordered rule enforcement and exception handling techniques can be represented as a finite state machine.
Since the policy enforcement process consists of a rule ordering phase and an exception handling phase,
we prove the determinism of these phases separately. We show that the Petri net execution algorithm
without exceptions is deterministic. We then introduce a new type of rule, called sink rule, that guarantees
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termination of rule enforcement. We then argue that acyclic policies with sink rules enable deterministic
enforcement.
Theorem 9.1: Exception-free workflow execution algorithm is deterministic.
The Petri net execution algorithm presented in figure 8.5 is deterministic if no exceptions are generated
during execution. We show this by structural induction on the Petri net.
Basis:
The Petri net is represented as (P,T,L) where P is the set of places, T is the set of transitions and L is the
flow relation.
case 1: P = {Start, aψ}, T = {t1}, L = {(Start, t1), (t1, a
ψ)}, where aψ represents the Petri net place
corresponding to action a.
The algorithm maps the above Petri net into a DFA, D = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) as follows:
Q = {exec(Start), exec(a), Stop},Σ = {end}, q0 = exec(Start), F = {Stop}
δ : {(exec(Start), end)→ exec(a), (exec(a), end)→ Stop}
where exec(a) represents execution of action a and exec(Start) represents the start state of the DFA.
case 2: P = {Start, aψ1 , ..., a
ψ
n}, T = {t1}, L = {(Start, t1)} ∪ {(t1, a
ψ
i )}i=1..n
The DFA for this Petri net is
Q = {exec(Start), exec({ai}i=1..n), Stop},Σ = {end}, q0 = exec(Start), F = {Stop}
δ : {(exec(Start), end)→ exec({ai}i=1..n), (exec({ai}i=1..n), end)→ Stop}
exec(A) represents the concurrent execution of the actions in set A. Since for a place p, (p.). represents the
set of confluent actions, the order of execution of the actions does not affect the final system state and so
can be considered to be deterministic.
case 3: P = {Start} ∪ {aψi }i=1..n ∪ {b
ψ}, T = {t1, t2}
L = {(Start, t1)} ∪ {(t1, {a
ψ
i }i=1..n), ({a
ψ
i }i=1..n, t2)} ∪ {(t2, b
ψ)}
This Petri net is mapped to the following DFA.
Q = {exec(Start), exec({ai}i=1..n), exec(b), Stop},Σ = {end}, q0 = exec(Start), F = {Stop}
δ : {(exec(Start), end)→ exec({ai}i=1..n), (exec({ai}i=1..n), end)→ exec(b), (exec(b), end)→ Stop}
76
Hypothesis: The algorithm maps a Petri net R = (P, T, L), into a DFA
Q = {exec(actions(p)), ∀p ∈ 2P } ∪ {exec(Start)} ∪ {Stop}Σ = {end}q0 = exec(Start)F = {Stop}
δ : {∀X ∈ places(Q − F )|(X · )· 6= φ, (exec(actions(X)), end) → exec(actions((X · )· )), ∀X ∈ places(Q −
F )|(X · )·= φ, (exec(actions(X)), end)→ Stop}
where actions(K) = {action(k)}∀k∈K and places(R) = {a
ψ|∀r ∈ R, r = exec(a)} ∪ {Start|∃r ∈ R, r =
Start}
Proof :
case 1: Extend the Petri net with a new action b, such that
∃p ∈ P |(p· )·= φ
p·= p· ∪ tnew
tnew·= tnew· ∪ b
ψ
The algorithm maps the Petri net into
Q'= Q ∪ {exec(b)} ∪ {Stop'},Σ'= {end}, q0'= exec({Start}), F '= {Stop'},
δ'= δ ∪ {(Stop, end)→ exec(b)} ∪ {(exec(b), end)→ Stop'} which is a DFA.
case 2: Extend the Petri net with a set of places {bψ1 , ..., b
ψ
m} such that
∃p ∈ P |(p· )·= φ
p·= p· ∪tnew
tnew·= tnew· ∪i=1..mb
ψ
i
Since, concurrent places in the Petri net represent confluent actions, according to the Petri net construc-
tion algorithms from chapter 6, the algorithm maps the Petri net into the DFA,
Q'= Q ∪ {exec({bi}i=1..m)} ∪ {Stop'},Σ'= {end}, q0'= exec(Start), F '= {Stop'},
δ'= δ ∪ {(Stop, end)→ exec({bi}i=1..m)} ∪ {exec({bi}i=1..m), end)→ Stop'}
case 3: Extend the Petri net with an action b such that
∃P '⊂ P |∀p ∈ P ', (p· )·= φ
p·= p· ∪tnew
tnew·= tnew· ∪ b
ψ
Since, actions in places of P 'represent concurrent actions that terminate the workflow, there is a transition
in the DFA of the Petri net
δ(exec(actions(P ')), end) = Stop
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The algorithm replaces this transition as follows:
δ'= (δ − {(exec(actions(P ')), end)→ Stop}) ∪ {(exec(actions(P ')), end)→ exec(b)} ∪ {(exec(b), end)→
Stop}, which is a DFA. 2
If exceptions are generated during action execution, the verification system generates exception events.
The policy should contain exception handler rules, for deterministic behavior of the system. If exception
handler rules are not present, the system may reach an unpredictable state. A policy should contain excep-
tion handler rules for all possible exceptions that might be generated during action execution.
Definition 9.1: A policy P is said to be exception-complete, if ∀r ∈ P, ∀p ∈ post(action(r)), ∃ex ∈
P |event(ex) is the exception event of p.
An exception-complete policy contains exception handlers rules corresponding to each predicate in the
various action post-conditions. Since actions in exception-handler rules can themselves fail, we define a type
of rule called sink rule whose action generates no exceptions.
Definition 9.2: A sink rule is a rule, whose condition and action pre-condition evaluate to true when the
rule is triggered and action post-condition evaluates to true after the action execution.
A sink rule is necessary to terminate the exception handling process. The enforcement system provides
an action called logException(RuleContext rc) that logs the exception. Since this action is an internal action
of the management system, it does not fail. Rules can use this action to prevent further exception generation.
Figure 9.1 shows a subset of the policy of figure 8.1 extended with sink rules. This policy is also exception-
complete. Rules R94 and R95 are sink rules. When R92 or R93 is triggered, R94 or R95 is also triggered,
respectively. Actions of the sink rules log the exceptions and do not affect the enforcement process.
Theorem 9.2: The workflow execution algorithm for a non-cyclic exception-complete policy with sink
rules for every exception event is deterministic.
Proof: Since the policy is exception-complete, the exception handling process maps one Petri net workflow
into another by substituting one or more exception handler actions for every failed rule.
Let P/E represent the set of triggered rules of policy P on reception of events in E and ee(x) represent
the exception events for predicates in x.
The exception handling process can be represented as a DFA (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) where
Q = {P/E|∀E ∈ 2Events(P )} ∪ {Stop},Σ = {succ, fail}, q0 = {P/E|E ⊂ Events(P )}, F = {Stop}
δ : {(P/E, succ)∀E∈2Events(P) → Stop, (P/E, fail) → P/E '|E '= {ee(x)|∀r ∈ P/E, r is unenforced ∧x =
post(r)}}
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R91 : on(r91, ObjectEnter(Device d, Space s))
if(roleDevice(d) == “guest”)
{statusSpace(s, running)}
do(AutoAuthorizeDeviceAndInitiateHBeats(d, s));
{ authorizationStatus(d, authorized) && heartbeatStatus(d, started)}
R92 : on(e1, authorizationFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(roleDevice(d) = = “guest” && rc.id != “e1”)
{true}
do(PasswordAuthorizeDevice(d));
{ authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
R93 : on(e2, heartbeatStartFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(rc.id != “e2”) //avoids loop
{authorizationStatus(d, authorized)}
do(InitiateHeartbeats(d, 100));
{heartbeatStatus(d, started)}
R94 : on(s1, authorizationFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(true)
{true}
do(logException(rc));
{true}
R95 : on(s2, heartbeatStartFailed(Device d, RuleContext rc))
if(true)
{true}
do(logException(rc));
{true}
Figure 9.1: Example policy with sink rules
Since the policy is non-cyclic with sink rules for every exception event, for every subset E ⊆ Events(P )
there is a finite sequence of enforcement failures P/E ;fail P/E ', such that P/E 'is a set of sink rules.
Since actions of sink rules do not fail, enforcement eventually terminates.
The exception handling process maps one Petri net into another with exception handling rules. Since the
exception handling process for each action in the Petri net eventually terminates, there is a finite number
of Petri nets constructed for every set of events received. Since from theorem 9.1 the Petri net execution
algorithm is deterministic, the workflow execution algorithm for non-cyclic exception-complete policy with
sink rules for every exception event is also deterministic. 2
9.3 Discussion
This chapter formally proves that the ECPAP framework enables deterministic policy-based management.
The framework prescribes a methodology of policy design that ensures that the system reaches a well-defined
predictable state after rule enforcement. If the required exception handling rules or sink rules are not present
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in the policy, no guarantees can be provided by the framework. Previous policy enforcement systems were
non-deterministic even if the policy contained rules for all possible exception situations.
Currently, our proofs assume the presence of exception handling rules and sink rules for all possible
situations. This requirement can be relaxed if certain exception rules can be mapped to regular system
events. In addition, the number of sink rules can be greatly reduced if the exception generation system can
have some state information that generates pre-specified events when actions of exception handlers fail.
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Chapter 10
Role-based Management
The dynamism of active spaces due to changing entities and configuration complicates policy design. Policies
have to be modified when entities enter or exit an active space. Designing policies using roles alleviates some
of these problems and simplifies policy design. In this chapter, we present a role-based management approach
to designing active space policies. In section 10.1, we discuss the complexity of policy design in dynamic
environments. We describe role-based policy design in security and management systems in section 10.2. We
present our framework for role-based management in section 10.3 and discuss the various models in section
10.4. We present the design of the role manager in section 10.5 and conclude.
10.1 Complexity of Policy Design
An active space is a dynamic system with changing system components and configuration. Entities such as
devices, applications and users are constantly added or removed from the system. Configuration changes
necessitate frequent policy redesign to accommodate new entities and modified configurations. This increases
the overhead associated with managing policy additions and removals. For example, devices and applications
in an active space need to send periodic heartbeat messages on a well-defined channel to announce their
presence in the space. If the device is owned by a guest user, the device should report its location periodically
to the active space. Therefore, when a new device is brought into the space, the device must be configured
to fulfill the above obligations. Rules must be designed for the above obligations making administration of
an active space a laborious process. Similarly, when a device leaves the space these rules must be removed
to avoid exceptions.
Rules can also be modified in an active space. For example, if the number of devices in an active
space crosses a certain threshold, the overhead of heartbeats becomes significant. In such circumstances,
the heartbeat initiation rules are modified to reduce the frequency of heartbeats. The policy system should
determine the heartbeat initiation rules for the various entities and modify them to reflect the new guidelines.
Entities in an active space share a set of common obligations – all entities should send out heartbeat
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messages; mobile devices should report their locations periodically to the location system [SACM05]; guest
devices should authenticate themselves when they enter an active space; applications should checkpoint
periodically and so on. This property can be exploited to simplify policy design and management.
10.2 Role-based Design
Though active space entities change frequently, the types of entities present in a space remain fairly un-
changed. For instance, cell phones, PDAs and laptops are added and removed from an active space as users
enter and leave the space but the entity type Mobile Device is always present in the set of types supported
by an active space. Role-based management is an appropriate technique of decoupling entities from policy
specification by introducing a logical separation using roles. A role groups related entities based on certain
common characteristics. For example, all mobile devices have a common characteristic of being mobile –
they have location sensors attached to them, run on battery power, normally communicate using wireless
technologies and have limited resources. Similarly, all applications have common characteristics - they use
the Gaia application framework [Rom03]; they can be migrated across devices; and they checkpoint their
state periodically. Since many entities grouped under a single role have common obligations to fulfill, policies
can be designed for roles instead of individual entities. When an entity is assigned to a role, the entity takes
up the obligations associated with that role. For instance, when a laptop is added to the MobileDevice role,
it has to fulfill the various obligations listed above.
Therefore, we introduced the notion of roles, based on entity types, for active space management. Role-
based management was proposed in [Lup98] for managing distributed systems. Roles were created for
different kinds of administrative positions and obligation policies were assigned to these roles. Users and
automated agents assigned to these roles were required to fulfill the role obligations. We extend this notion
of roles to entity types such as devices, applications, services and so on by creating a role for each type.
Obligation policies and entities are assigned to these roles and entities are required to fulfill role obligations.
Role-based access control (RBAC) [SCFY96] is used extensively in computer security to assign access
permissions to users using authorization policies. RBAC uses a notion of subjects, which are processes
running on behalf of users [FCK95], and provides a one-to-many mapping from users to subjects. Permis-
sions assigned to users percolate to subjects. Role-based management (RBM) extends the role concept to
obligation policies. While authorization policies are based on users, obligation policies should be based on
both users and entities since different entities have different obligations to fulfill even though they all belong
to the same user. For example, all devices should mount their file systems onto the active space file system
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when the devices are brought into the active space. This obligation cannot be assigned to the user role,
since some devices such as mobile phones may not have a file system. In [Lup98], Lupu et al. propose a
role-based management model entirely based on user roles. Obligations are assigned to a user role and all
entities owned by the user must fulfill these obligations. Their model does not create roles for entities based
on their capabilities. The heterogeneity of active spaces necessitates a role-based management model that
groups entities not only on the obligations that they need to fulfill but also on the capabilities that they
possess. Therefore, active space roles are based on entity types and user types. In this thesis, we generalize
our discussion by only considering entity roles since users can also be viewed as entities with regard to roles.
Roles classify entities into groups and differ from data types. In many instances, roles can be substituted
for types and therefore, it is important to distinguish between the two. We make the following distinction
between roles and types :
• Organization guidelines specify the way a system should be managed and therefore, define the different
management activities that should be performed by various system components. In role-based manage-
ment, entities that have common characteristics and fulfill similar obligations are grouped into roles.
Therefore, roles are primarily based on organization guidelines and dependent on the deployment.
Types define the set of operations that should be supported by an entity. For example, the type
Space refers to entities that support active space operations such as reboot, hibernate, deployService,
stopApplication and so on. Types are based on the managed system and are independent of the
organization guidelines.
• Entities can be associated with multiple unrelated roles but with a single type. For example, a device
can be in the Mobile, Guest and IdentificationDevice roles but can only be of type Device.
• The role associated with an entity can dynamically change but the type of the entity cannot.
• Roles can have constraints associated with them. These constraint can dictate the maximum number
of entities that can be assigned to the role, the obligations that are inherited across role hierarchies
and so on. These are discussed in more detail in later sections. Types do not support such constraints.
10.3 Role-based ECA Rules
Roles are created based on entity types and assigned rule templates. Rule templates are ECA rules designed
with reference to roles. The keyword role is used in the template to denote the entity reference. When an
entity is assigned to a role, the rule template gets instantiated using the entity reference. The reference
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Entity Role:
on(TimerEvent()) on(TimerEvent())
if(true) ======> if(true)
do(sendHeartbeat(role)); do(sendHeartbeat(“handheld01”));
Device Role:
on(ObjectEnter(role, Space s)) on(ObjectEnter(“laptop-21”, Space s))
if(s.type == “research-lab”) ======> if(s.type == “research-lab”)
do(authenticate(role, s)); do(authenticate(“laptop-21”, s));
on(TimerEvent()) on(TimerEvent())
if(true) ======> if(true)
do(reportLocation(role)); do(reportLocation(“tablet-3105”));
Application Role:
on(TimerEvent()) on(TimerEvent())
if(true) ======> if(true)
do(checkpoint(role)); do(checkpoint(“editapp”));
Figure 10.1: Typical Active Space Rule Templates and Instantiated Rules
is substituted for the role keyword. Figure 10.1 shows a set of rule templates for various roles and the
corresponding rule instantiations.
Roles are managed by an active space service called Role Manager. A rule template can be added
and removed from a role dynamically when the active space is running using the role manager interfaces.
When an entity is instantiated or brought into an active space, it is assigned to a role. Currently, we use
manual techniques for role assignment. For example, when an application is started in an active space, the
user chooses the role for the application through a user interface to the role manager. The role manager
instantiates the rule templates and adds them to the management system. In addition, the role manager
maintains a list of entities assigned to a role for all roles and is used for revocation of rules.
10.4 RBM Models
We define four different role-based management models that correspond to the models of RBAC [SCFY96].
The base model RBM0 contains only roles. RBM1 supports role hierarchies and enables policy inheritance.
RBM2 supports role constraints that enable specification of restrictions on roles. RBM3 supports both role
hierarchies and constraints. Figure 10.2 shows the relationship between different RBM models.
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Figure 10.2: Role-based Management Models
10.4.1 Role Hierarchies
Roles may contain some or all obligations of another role. For example, both devices and applications
need to send heartbeats to periodically announce their presence. This is a common obligation shared
between the roles Device and Application. Mobile devices in addition have to periodically send their
location information in addition to sending out heartbeat messages. Therefore, the obligations of the role
MobileDevice is a super set of that of Device. It would be convenient if common obligations can be specified
once and reused by multiple roles. Organizing roles hierarchically enables obligation reuse and makes policy
management simpler. A role hierarchy defines roles that have unique obligations and may implicitly include
the obligations associated with another role [FCK95]. The role hierarchy is defined using a partial order
relation called contains. Role r1 contains role r2 if the set of obligations of r1 is a superset of that of r2. r1
is called a sub-role of r2 and r2 is called a super-role of r1. Sub-roles inherit obligations from super-roles. A
partial hierarchy of roles used in our active space is shown in figure 10.3. The role ActiveSpaceEntity is a
super-role for roles Device and Application. Therefore, the common obligation to send heartbeats can be
assigned to the role ActiveSpaceEntity.
10.4.2 Role Constraints
Role constraints define restrictions on roles and role hierarchies. RBAC3 uses constraints for separation of
duty, limiting the number of users assigned to a role and enforcing various other organizational requirements
[SCFY96]. Constraints can be used very effectively in role-based management to specify what rule templates
can be inherited and overridden. Constraints can also be used to limit the number of entities and type of
obligations assigned to a role and to specify role-based priorities for conflict resolution.
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Figure 10.3: Partial Active Space Role Hierarchy
RCL2000 was proposed as a constraint language for Role-based Access Control [AS00]. RCL2000 uses
first-order predicate logic expressions to specify various types of constraints on roles, users, objects and
operations. To the best of our knowledge, there are no constraint languages for role-based management.
In this thesis, we use a restricted form of RCL2000 to specify constraints. This restricted form limits the
constraints that can be specified. A formal constraint language for role-based management is necessary and
is discussed in detail in chapter 13.
The language we consider contains the following basic elements and functions:
R = a set of roles {r1, ..., rn}
E = a set of entities {e1, ..., em}
RT = a set of rule templates {rt1, ..., rtq}
RH ⊆ R x R is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy or role dominance relation, written as 
EA ⊂ E x R, a many-to-many entity-to-role assignment relation
OBLIGATIONS: R x 2RT , a one-to-many role-to-rule template relation
entities(r) = {e|(e, r) ∈ EA}
roles(e) = {r|(e, r) ∈ EA}
obligations(r) = {o|(r, o) ∈ OBLIGATIONS}
inherit : OBLIGATIONS x {true, false}, a one-to-one obligation-to-Boolean relation that defines if an
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obligation can be inherited by a sub-role
With this language, we can express simple constraints to limit number of entities and obligations assigned
to a role, stop obligation from being inherited and mandate assignment of an entity to role A if it is assigned
to role B.
(a) maximum number of entities in a role
|entities(r)| ≤ n
(b) maximum number of obligations assigned to a role
|obligations(r)| ≤ n
(c) Stop obligation from being inherited
inherit(o) = false
(d) If entity is assigned to role A, it should also be assigned to B
A ∈ role(e)→ B ∈ role(e)
10.5 Role Manager
Role manager is a Gaia service that is responsible for managing the life cycle of a role. It stores the various
roles of an active space in a repository along with role inheritance graphs and constraints. Each role stores
the rule templates associated with that role. The role manager provides interfaces to add and remove roles,
assign roles to entities, add rule templates and constraints to roles and modify the inheritance graph.
An entity is assigned to a role by providing its unique reference to the role manager. Active space
components are CORBA objects, which are identified by a unique reference called Interoperable Object
Reference (IOR). An IOR is an encoding of the hostname, port and various other information that is used
to communicate with an object. When the entity is assigned to the role, the role manager traverses the
role hierarchy and collects the rule templates. At each role, the constraints associated with that role are
evaluated. All rule templates are instantiated with the object’s reference and loaded into the management
system.
10.6 Policy Analysis
Rule templates can be statically analyzed to determine any conflicts or cycles. Since rule templates are
instantiated into rules before enforcement, normal dynamic analysis is performed at enforcvement time. In
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this section, we focus on static analysis of rule templates.
10.6.1 Conflict Analysis
Conflict analysis on rule templates is performed similar to that discussed in chapter 5. Static matching of
events and conditions are performed by treating roles as data types. For the purposes of analysis, two roles
are considered equivalent if one role is a sub-role of another or there is a common sub-role for the two roles.
For example, in figure 10.3 roles Device and ImmobileDevice are equivalent since the latter is a sub-role of
the former. Similarly, roles MobileDevice and User are equivalent since they share the common sub-role
UserHandhelds.
In order to match two event signatures, the analysis algorithm compares their event names and their
parameters. If the parameters refer to roles, then equivalence between two roles is checked. Once events and
conditions match, the algorithm performs conflict analysis similar to that described in section 5.2.
10.6.2 Cycle Analysis
The cycle detection algorithm is similar to that presented in section 5.3 except that equivalence checking of
parameters is performed on the event signatures to generate the trigger graph. A rule triggers another rule
if the event listed in the action post-condition of the former rule matches the event of the latter rule by the
parameter equivalence approach defined in the previous subsection.
10.7 Conclusion
Role-based management is a suitable approach for managing dynamic systems such as active spaces. Roles
provide a logical separation between entities and policies. Rules are designed for roles instead of entities and
any entity assigned to a role should fulfill the obligations associated with that role. We have proposed a few
models for role-based management similar to that of role-based access control. We have developed a simple
language for specifying role constraints based on RCL2000. Initial experiences with role-based management
of active spaces seems encouraging.
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Chapter 11
Architecture and Implementation
In this chapter, we discuss the architecture and implementation details of the management system. Section
11.1 details the overall architecture and how the different pieces of the system fit together. Section 11.2
presents the policy compiler. Section 11.3 presents the runtime system and provides details about the various
enforcement components. We evaluate the system in section 11.4 and present case studies of the usage of
the management system on two distributed systems in section 11.5. We finally the conclude the chapter
with an identification of the salient features of our system.
11.1 Architecture
The management system consists of two main parts - static analyzer and runtime enforcement system as
depicted in figure 11.1. The static analyzer is responsible for conflicts and cycles. It uses a policy compiler
that takes an ECA policy as input and generates an object file. The object file is a set of Java classes
corresponding to the different policy rules. Policy compilation is discussed in detail in section 11.2. The
object file is compiled and loaded into the runtime system by the policy loader. The policy compiler interacts
with a Prolog engine, called XSB [XSB] for propositional reasoning. A repository of actions, called action
library, contains a set of actions that can be invoked by policy rules. The library also contains pre- and
post-conditions of actions. The compiler queries the library for these specifications during static analysis.
The runtime system is made up of a number of components. The enforcement coordinator is responsible
for managing the policies in the policy store, receiving events, evaluating rules, forwarding rules for dynamic
analysis and finally forwarding the workflow to the execution engine and verifier. The runtime system
consists of an event composer that composes primitive events into a complex event. This system is useful
for sensing situations based on multiple events. For example, failure of a cluster of nodes is a combination
of failures of all individual nodes. The event composer generates a cluster failure event from a set of node
failure events. The policy and model store contain the rules and state models loaded into the enforcement
system. The dynamic reasoning system is responsible for dynamic conflict and dependency analysis. It uses
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Figure 11.1: Management System Architecture
a prolog engine for analysis. The workflow executor and enforcement verifier are responsible for execution
of the constructed action workflow and subsequent verification of execution, respectively.
11.2 Policy Compiler
The policy compiler performs static conflict and cycle analysis. It translates a policy into a set of Java
classes. Each ECA rule is converted into a Java class. The event part of the rule is mapped into a method
in the class, the condition part into an ‘if’ block and the action part into a set of instructions that creates
an action object. Figure 11.2 shows an ECA rule and its equivalent Java class.
As shown in the figure, the event AggregatorFail(Node n) is mapped into a method of the same signa-
ture. The condition (n.id ! = “FailOver”) is mapped to an if structure with the same relational expression.
The action useNodeAsAggregator(“FailOver”) is mapped into a sequence of statements that create an ob-
ject containing the action object and its specifications. This approach of conversion of a policy into native
language code enables reuse of language types and simplifies event matching and condition expression evalu-
ation. The Java classes are compiled and the class files are loaded into the policy enforcement system by the
policy loader. The policy compiler has been designed in Java. We used the ANTLR [Par] parser generator
to generate the lexical analyzer and parser from the policy grammar. The policy grammar is presented in
appendix I.
The policy language reuses many of the Java types and some types specifically designed for active spaces.
90
import java.util.HashSet;
import AdaptiveMonitoringService.AxiomatizedAction;
import AdaptiveMonitoringService.Types.Node;
import AdaptiveMonitoringService.Types.Service;
import AdaptiveMonitoringService.Types.Process;
import AdaptiveMonitoringService.Types.Container;
public class FailOver
{
    public HashSet AggregatorFail(Node n)
   {
        HashSet hs = new HashSet();
        if (n.id != "FailOver")
        {
useNodeAsAggregator tmp = new useNodeAsAggregator("FailOver") ;
AxiomatizedAction act = new AxiomatizedAction();
act.precond = tmp.getPrecond();
act.actuator = tmp;
act.postcond = tmp.getPostcond();
hs.add(act);
       }
        return hs;
  }
}
on(AggregatorFail(Node n))
if (n.id != “FailOver”)
do (useNodeAsAggregator(“FailOver”) )
Rule
Java Class
Compile
Figure 11.2: Policy Compilation
These active space types represent entities of a pervasive system such as devices, applications, services and
users. These types are presented in detail in [RSAM+05].
The policy compiler uses the XSB prolog engine [XSB]. XSB is a prolog interpreter for logic programming.
It supports propositional reasoning and is used during both static and dynamic analyses.
The action library is a set of actions that can be invoked by policy rules. Methods of several services or
applications in the system may not expose appropriate interfaces for invocation by the policy enforcement
system. The action library contains wrappers for such methods and these wrappers forward the invocations
to the actual services or applications through different means such as CORBA RPC, Java RMI and socket
calls.
We have provided a few tools for designing policies. The event catalog lists the various events supported
in the system along with their parameters [Bor02]. The action library supports a look-up interface that lists
the supported actions along with their specifications. Snapshots of the interfaces to these tools are shown
in figure 11.3.
11.3 Policy Enforcement System
The policy enforcement system has been implemented in Java. As depicted in figure 11.1, the enforcement
coordinator is central to the enforcement system and orchestrates the functioning of the other components.
When a policy is loaded, the Java class objects are stored in the policy store. The event composer listens
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Figure 11.3: Policy Design Tools
Events : set of received events
Pstore : policy store
ActionSet = {} : set of triggered rule actions
forall e in Events
forall p in Pstore
ret := p.invoke(e)
if (ret != fail)
ActionSet = ActionSet ∪ ret
endif
endfor
endfor
Figure 11.4: Rule Evaluation Algorithm
on a well-defined event channel called MgmtChannel. The system assumes that all events of interest are
sent on this channel. When an event is received, the event composer forwards this event to the coordinator,
which constructs a method signature from it. This method is invoked on all class objects in the policy store.
If the invocation is successful, the condition is evaluated. The rule object returns an object containing the
action with its specifications. This object is added to an action set. The algorithm for rule evaluation is
shown in figure 11.4.
The action set is sent to the dynamic analyzer that performs conflict analysis using the XSB propositional
reasoning engine and constructs a workflow of actions as described in chapter 6. This workflow is executed
by the workflow executor and the enforcement verification system verifies action execution by checking the
post-condition or by initiating a monitoring thread.
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Rule Processor
The rule processor is a component in the enforcement service that evaluates the policy rules and maps
a set of events to a set of triggered rule actions. The rule processor processes event sets in sequence and
consists of an event queue to buffer events that are received when an event set is being processed.
Dynamic Conflict Resolver
The dynamic conflict resolver detects and resolves conflicts that are found at runtime using the algorithms
described in chapter 5. Resolution rules are loaded into the resolver through the enforcement coordinator
interface. The resolver filters conflicting rules based on priorities and returns a non-conflicting set of actions
to the enforcement coordinator.
class Place
{
String placeName;
AxiomatizedAction aa; //actions with specifications
HashSet<Transition> connectedToTransitions; //set of Transitions that this Place connects to
HashSet<Transition> connectedFromTransitions; //set of Transitions that connect to this Place
Boolean triviallyEnabled = false; //flag to indicate trivial satisfaction
int executionStatus = 0; //indicates if this place action was successfully executed once entire
//Petri net executes. used for exception handling.
//0 - unexecuted, 1 - successfully executed, 2 failed
HashSet<RuleException> reset = null; //rule exception set - contains rule exceptions if action failed
}
class Transition
{
String transName;
HashSet<Place> connectedToPlaces; //set of Places that this Transition connects to
String[] predicateSet; //a transition node contains a set of predicates that represents the
//pre-condition of one Petri net place (action).
//Each predicate in this set is a conjunct of the pre-condition
HashSet<Place> connectedFromPlaces;
}
Figure 11.5: Petri net Workflow Data Structures
Workflow Generator
The workflow generator analyzes dependencies and constructs a workflow of rule actions using the al-
gorithms described in chapter 6. The Petri net workflow is represented as an adjacency set of places and
93
transitions. The Petri net data structures are shown in figure 11.5. Each Place structure contains a list of
transitions that it connects to and a list of transitions that connect to the place. The former list is required
to know the transitions that should be processed after the action in the place is executed. The latter list
is required to know how many tokens are expected before the action in the place is executed. Since our
workflow execution system uses two kinds of tokens – regular and exception, an action in a Petri net place
fires if at least one regular token is received. The action is not executed if all transitions to the place send
exception tokens. Therefore, the list of transitions that lead to the place is required. The Place structure
also contains a flag to indicate if the place action is trivially-enabled and a flag indicating if the action was
successful.
The structure Transition contains a list of places that lead to the transition and a list of places that the
transition leads to. Since a transition fires only after all places leading to the transition fire, the former list
is required. The latter list is used to forward the tokens after the transition fires. The Transition structure
also contains a set that holds the conjuncts of the associated Boolean function. This Boolean function is
evaluated before the transition fires.
Execution Engine and Enforcement Verifier
The workflow executor uses the algorithm in figure 8.5 to execute the Petri net workflow. At the end
of each action execution, the result from enforcement verifier determines the token flow in the Petri net.
The enforcement verifier evaluates a predicate of the form p(x, a) by invoking a method call p(x) and
comparing the return value with a. For example, statusSpace(“myspace”, “running”) is interpreted as
statusSpace(“myspace”) == “running”.
Temporal expressions are monitored by the enforcement monitoring system. Each expression has an
associated monitoring thread that executes for the duration of validity of the expression. Expressions are
monitored by polling or event reception. Polling is employed if the entity being monitored does not generate
events on required changes. The frequency of polling is currently a few seconds but can be modified based
on the monitored entity.
Policy and Model Store
The policy store is a repository of rules that are loaded into the management system. Each rule is stored
as a Java object and has a unique identifier that is used to access the rule. The store provides interfaces for
adding, removing and querying rule objects.
The model store is a database of configuration information and persistent state predicates. The con-
94
module RoleManager
{
interface RoleManagerService
{
string createRole(in string roleName);
string connect(in string parentRole, in string childRole);
string addRuleTemplate(in string roleName, in string ruleTemplate);
string addRoleConstraint(in string roleName, in string constraintStr);
short addRoleEntity(in string roleName, in string memberName);
string assignEntity(in string roleName, in string entityId);
};
};
Figure 11.6: Role Manager Interface
figuration information is stored as key-value pairs and the persistent state predicates are stored as a set.
The model store is accessed by the enforcement monitoring system that creates threads to monitor each
persistent state predicate.
Role Manager
The role manager is also implemented as a database of roles, constraints and rule templates. It provides
interfaces for role operations, rule template instantiation and constraint specification. The main interfaces
to the role manager are shown in figure 11.6.
Enforcement Log
The management service contains a log of the events received, triggered rules, action workflow and
exceptions, if any. This log can be used for debugging policy errors and profiling the performance of the
management system.
11.4 System Evaluation
The infrastructure of the active spaces prototype system consists of a set of desktop computers running
1.5GHz Pentium 4 CPUs with 1 GB of RAM each. These computers run the Gaia kernel with various
services. A set of plasma displays and high definition screens act as interfaces to the active spaces system.
Several mobile devices such as laptops, handhelds and mobile phones are part of the system. Location
sensors, RFId detectors and finger print scanners have their own services that are part of the Gaia kernel
services.
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Figure 11.7: Rule Evaluation Overhead
As previously discussed, the management system consists of a set of services that are part of the Gaia
kernel. The services execute on one of the kernel machines. Most of the services of the management system
have been designed in Java. The other services of Gaia have been developed using C++. The management
services interact with the Gaia services using CORBA communication middleware. Figure 11.7 shows the
time required for rule evaluation. For a policy with 2000 rules the system takes about 100 msecs.
11.5 Case Studies
In this section, we present case studies of using the management system on two other distributed systems.
These studies demonstrate the importance of using the ECPAP framework in non-pervasive settings. Subsec-
tion 11.5.1 presents our experience of using the system for managing a monitoring system, called Ganglia, on
PlanetLab clusters. Subsection 11.5.2 demonstrates the advantages of the ECPAP framework for designing
policies for a cluster file server.
11.5.1 Monitoring System Management on PlanetLab
In addition to using the management system for active space management, we used the system for managing
a monitoring system, called Ganglia, for changes in configurations and faults.
Ganglia is a wide-area monitoring system that can be used to monitor the health of nodes in a distributed
system [MCC]. Ganglia contains a data collection system and a data distribution system. The data collection
system gathers performance information of a node using a daemon called gmond. An aggregation agent,
called gmetad, aggregates information from multiple gmond daemons. The distribution system forms an
overlay network of gmetads and gmonds that collectively process data and distribute it to interested clients.
Ganglia has been deployed on Globus Grid [Fos05], PlanetLab nodes [STI+06] and various other commercial
and academic systems.
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Figure 11.10(a) shows the configuration of the Ganglia system deployed on PlanetLab nodes. A set
of nodes planetlabXX.cs.washington.edu and planetlabY Y.millennium.berkeley.edu form the monitored
environment and host gmond daemons that collect performance data such as CPU load, memory used and so
on. A node called aggregator, receives data from the monitored nodes and aggregates them by applying an
aggregation function. This data is distributed to interested clients (archival store and performance visualizer
in the figure). The configuration also contains a Failover node that replaces the aggregator node if the latter
fails. This replacement is enforced by the policy shown in figure 11.8.
Fault detectors distributed in the system detect different kinds of failures and send out events. When the
aggregator node fails, the system generates an AggregatorFailure event. Since the failure of the node kills all
processes running on the system, the gmetad aggregation agent also fails. AggregationAgentStopped event
is generated by the fault detectors. When the monitored nodes fail to connect to the crashed aggregator,
they each send out a DataSendFail event. Similarly, when the archival store and visualizer nodes do
not receive any data, they each send out a DataReceptionFail event. Therefore, a single change in the
monitoring system causes 1 AggregatorFailure, 1 AggregationAgentStopped, 2 DataSendFail (one from
each monitored node) and 2 DataReceptionFail (one from each client node) events.
The policy enforcement system receives the above events and evaluates the policy rules from figure 11.8.
One instance each of rules R111 and R114 and two instances each of rules R112 and R113 are triggered. The
system constructs the Petri net workflow shown in figure 11.9 by analyzing the dependencies. This Petri net
is executed by the workflow execution system.
Figure 11.10(b) shows the output of the visualizer node during adaptation with and without ECPAP
reasoning. The graphs show the CPU load and memory used over a 1 hour time window. In the first set
of graphs (figure 11.10(b)(i), when the aggregator node was stopped, multiple instances of the rules were
triggered. The system did no reasoning to determine the order of rules and rules were enforced in a random
order. The aggregation agent failed to start and a complete disruption in data reception was observed.
In the second set of graphs in figure 11.10(b)(ii), reasoning was enabled to determine dependencies among
triggered rule actions. The enforcement of the rules was ordered based on the dependencies between actions.
The figure shows a temporary disruption in data while the system recovered. The aggregation agent was
successfully started and data reception resumed.
This study demonstrated the need for ordering rule enforcements when multiple rules are simultaneously
triggered. The overhead of workflow construction was of the order of a few seconds which is a negligible
overhead for a management system.
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R111: on(r111, AggregatorFailure(Node n))
if(n.id != “FailOver”)
{statusNode(“FailOver”, running}
do(useNodeAsAggregator(“FailOver”));
{ statusAggregator(running)}
R112 : on(r112, DataSendFail(Node n))
if(n.type == “MonitoredNode”)
{statusAggregator(running)}
do(reconnectToAggregator(n));
{connectionStatusToAggregator(n, connected)}
R113 : on(r113, DataReceptionFail(Node n))
if(true)
{statusAggregator(running)}
do(reconnectToAggregator(n));
{connectionStatusToAggregator(n, connected)}
R114 : on(r114, AggregationAgentStopped(Node n))
if(true)
{statusAggregator(running) ∧ ∀x ∈ MonitoredNodes, connectionStatusToAggregator(x, connected)
∧ ∀x ∈ ClientNodes, connectionStatusToAggregator(x, connected) }
do(restartAggregationAgent());
{statusService(“AggregationAgent”, running)}
Figure 11.8: Ganglia Management Policy
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Figure 11.10: (a) Ganglia monitoring system deployed on PlanetLab nodes (b) Disruption in monitored data
during adaptation (as perceived by the visualizer node)
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Figure 11.11: Cluster File Server Configuration
11.5.2 Cluster File Server Management
Script-based management has been traditionally used to manage computational resources, network compo-
nents and file systems. System management scripts are programs that execute on system level triggers such
as timers, file system failures, virus notifications and so on. They are seldom executed by individual users.
Policies provide a natural extension to scripts by capturing situation-action pairs as rules. Most scripts
can be designed as policies. In addition, policies provide a centralized view of the different management
activities of a system and thus enable complex reasoning. The problems faced by script-based management
generally apply to policy-based systems as well. We studied how a cluster file system in the Computer
Science department at UIUC is managed using scripts.
The file system serves a cluster of 200 nodes that run various applications for course assignments, class
lectures and so on. The configuration of the system is shown in figure 11.11. The system consists of one
main file server called DCSFiles that is mounted on all nodes of the cluster. Another file server called
DCSHome acts as a fail over server for DCSFiles. A central LDAP server contains credentials to access
the file server contents. Each of the nodes contact the LDAP server to obtain credentials prior to accessing
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Management scripts
Script Execution Situation Description
check csil linux On demand Logs into different machines using ssh and runs
specified command
post-install Triggered after package install Turns smartd off. Turns sendmail off
update Every night Updates any new node additions to cluster
logwatch Every night Checks all logs and mails results
mapper Every night Maps www.cs.uiuc.edu/home/... to /dcs/grads/...
radiate On demand Collect anti-virus run status from various nodes
automount On disk access failure Automatically mounts fail-over file system onto client
file system
setup On over 100 node failure Assigns DCSHome server as the new file server
transfer On demand Transfers mount points
Figure 11.12: Cluster File Server Management Scripts
DCSFiles. Periodically, the data in DCSFiles and DCSHome are backed up into the backup server.
When a node fails to access the file server, an email is sent out to the administrator. If the LDAP server
fails, the administrator receives multiple emails, one from each node trying to access the file server. If the
number of failure messages received is over 100, the file system is assumed to have failed and the backup
server (DCSHome) is mounted as the new server on all nodes. The scripts used to achieve this task are
listed in figure 11.12.
In the present system, the administrator coordinates between the different scripts and so avoids vari-
ous potential conflicts and cycles among the scripts. If the administrator intervention has to be reduced,
management should be more automated. This increases the possibility of occurrence of these problems.
We discuss the various problems that might arise and how the ECPAP framework would be useful in those
situations.
Policy Conflicts
Currently, the file server contains two rules to handle failures:
R115 : If number of failure messages is over 100 and DCSFiles is the file server, mount DCSHome as the
file server
R116 : If LDAP server fails, shutdown backup server
When the LDAP server fails, each node sends out a failure message as DCSFiles server is inaccessible.
In addition, an LDAP failure message is also sent out. Therefore, both rules have to be enforced. When
DCSHome is mounted as the new file server, all data on the server is treated as new and backed up. But
the LDAP server failure shuts down the backup server causing a conflict between the two rules. Since
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the administrator is currently involved, the rules are executed in sequence, with additional scripts executed
manually by the administrator to restart the LDAP server and the backup server before rule R115 is enforced.
If the management was automated, the two rules would conflict.
Designing the rules with the ECPAP framework would enable detection of such conflicts. The backing
up of data of DCSHome, when it is mounted as the new file server, is an effect of the mounting action. The
post-condition of the action would contain this information and the fact that the backup server is running
during this operation. The post-condition of R116 would specify that the backup server would be stopped
after the corresponding action executes. A simple post-condition constraint specifying that the backup server
should not be in the running and stopped states simultaneously would detect this conflict.
Policy Cycles
If a third rule is added to the above policy to assign DCSFiles as the file server if DCSHome failed,
on LDAP failure, it would result in an oscillation.
R117: If number of failure messages is over 100 and DCSHome is the file server, assign DCSFiles as
the file server.
When the LDAP server fails, either R115 or R117 is triggered depending on the current file server. When
one of the servers is assigned as the new server, the nodes try to contact the newly mounted server and fail.
This triggers the mounting of the other server. This oscillation takes place continuously. Currently, rule
R117 is not part of the system policy but a cycle can result if the rule is added accidentally.
The ECPAP framework would be able to detect cycles in such scenarios. The fact that the nodes try
to access the server on mounting is expressed as a post-condition of the mount operation. This action may
cause a failure event and this can be expressed as the post-condition of the node-access operation. A trigger
graph can be generated from this information and the cycle can be detected.
Problems with policy/script-based management
In addition, there are many other issues with script-based management that are applicable to policy-based
management systems as well. We summarize them below.
• Script errors: Many management scripts are developed by third-party vendors who may not have
tested them well. These scripts may fail during management requiring human intervention. Some
scripts may handle errors unfavorably making error detection a difficult task. A model for exception
handling of scripts is required to reduce administrator intervention.
• Automated situation analysis: Concluding the cause of an error in a system is a very laborious
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process. This requires automated situation analysis. In addition, management systems should support
triggering rules based on combinations of different system events.
• Ordered execution of scripts: Many scripts have to be executed in a specific order to manage
the system as specified by the organization guidelines. For example, kernel upgrades have to be
made before applications and services are upgraded. This requires certain ordering of management
activities. Currently, administrators determine the proper order and it would be desirable to automate
this process.
This study revealed that many existing systems managed by scripts face some of the problems that we
have addressed in this thesis. Currently, administrators frequently intervene and coordinate the management
process. If total automation of management has to be achieved, a framework for complex reasoning about
management activities should be designed. The ECPAP framework seems to address some of the issues and
is a promising step towards automated management.
11.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the architecture and implementation details of our management system. Some
of the salient features of the architecture that differentiates it from architectures of other existing policy-based
management systems are :
• Rule translation into native language code : The policy compiler translates ECA rules into Java
classes. This enables type reuse and simplifies event matching and condition expression evaluation.
• Policy debugging support : The management system provides support for policy debugging by
logging events, triggered rules, order of actions executed in the workflow executor and results of en-
forcement verification. By extending the logging information with timing information, the performance
of the management system can also be profiled.
• Tools for policy design : Our management system provides tools to look up events and actions that
are supported by the active space. This greatly aids policy design.
The initial evaluation of the system revealed negligible overhead from rule evaluation and enforcement.
The correctness guarantees provided by specification-enhanced rules justifies the extra overhead offered by
the system for analysis. User studies have to be conducted to determine the effort required to write action
specifications.
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In addition, we presented case studies of employing the ECPAP framework for managing two other
distributed systems. The studies demonstrated the benefits of using the framework for policy-based man-
agement.
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Chapter 12
Related Work
This chapter positions our work in relation to other research efforts on policy-based management of pervasive
and distributed systems. Various policy systems and frameworks have been developed in the past and these
systems focus on different aspects of a management system. We identify past research results related to each
component of our system and provide detailed comparisons.
12.1 Static Policy Analysis
Static analysis of a policy is performed prior to the policy being loaded into the management system. Many
research projects have focused on static analysis of policies for conflict analysis [CLN00, LS99]. Chomicki
et al. [CLN00] define a framework for detecting and resolving conflicts using a concept called monitors. A
monitor of a set of conflicting actions determines a subset of the actions that are free of conflicts. They define
a conflict as a violation of action constraints that specifies the set of actions that cannot occur together.
While action constraints can detect conflicts due to conflicting actions, they cannot detect conflicts arising
from the effects of actions. In our work, we define conflicts as violation of condition constraints and this
enables us to detect conflicts due to action effects. Lupu et al. [LS99] classify conflicts into modality and
application-specific conflicts. Modality conflicts arise when two or more policies with opposite modalities
refer to the same subjects, actions and targets. Application specific conflicts are situations that arise due to
external criteria such as limited resources and are enforced using organization constraints. An example of this
type of conflict is when a mobile device has to concurrently execute multiple resource intensive applications,
but the constraint limits the number of resource intensive applications to 1. None of the above approaches
to conflict detection detect conflicts that can occur due to side-effects of actions. Detecting such conflicts
requires formal specifications of actions and therefore, the ECPAP framework is well suited for it.
While most research works on static policy analysis focus on conflict analysis and resolution, none of
the research works deal with termination analysis. Determining a cycle in a set of policy rules requires
information about events that are generated due to action execution and therefore, the ECA framework
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is unable to detect such cycles. The ECPAP framework can list the set of events generated by the action
execution in the action post-condition and this enables termination analysis.
Agrawal et al. [ACG+05] perform dominance and coverage checks on policies in their work. Dominance
checks verify if situation of one rule is completely dominated by that of another such that the former is never
triggered. Coverage checks verify if a set of rules enforce intended policies on the whole managed system.
Both checks are based on ECA rules and therefore, can be directly applied on ECPAP rules. Dominance
checks can be extended to verify if action of one rule completely dominates the action of another by verifying
if post-condition of one action satisfied post-condition of another. Such checks are useful to eliminate the
execution of one action when both actions are eligible for execution.
12.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis of policies refers to the analysis that is performed during policy enforcement. Most policy
enforcement systems perform some kind of dynamic analysis. Dunlop et al. [DIR02] propose an approach
to detect conflicts that occur due to temporal aspects of actions and roles. Conflicts in their system are
defined as situations in which two rules have common subjects and targets and their actions affect common
system components. The scope of their conflict detection technique is on common subjects and targets. Our
work on conflict detection generalizes the approach and eliminates the need to specify subjects and targets
explicitly, since many management rules do not specify them.
Policy management for autonomic computing (PMAC) [Kam05] project from IBM research uses priorities
at runtime for conflict resolution [Ver05]. In addition, the project performs various analysis to determine
dominance and coverage checks. We limit our research to dynamic conflict analysis and resolution using
resolution rules, though our work can be extended with the above analyses.
While most policy research works focus on conflict analysis at runtime, none of the projects have addressed
the problem of determining enforcement order when multiple rules are simultaneously triggered. To the
best of our knowledge, our research work [SC06] is the first effort to address this important problem. As
demonstrated in earlier chapters, determining enforcement order and providing enforcement guarantees are
crucial and our work forms the first step in that direction.
12.3 Policy Verification/Monitoring
Verifying policy enforcement is important for effective policy-based management. Bettini et al. [BJWW02]
propose an approach for monitoring obligation policy enforcement. Their system model uses obligations
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based on message transfers and therefore, their monitoring system monitors if a send action exists for
every receive action by inspecting the history of messages sent by the service. While their work focuses on
monitoring communication of obligation policies, successful completion of action execution is not verified.
Actions can fail due to various reasons and this should be verified and corrective actions should be taken
for reliable policy enforcement. Our research work uses well-developed ideas from runtime verification
to determine the success of an action execution and also proposes an exception model for policy-based
management.
12.4 Model-based Management
Model-based management is an orthogonal approach to policy-based management that has been successfully
used for performance, security and file system management [UVS+04, LSMK99]. A mathematical model of
the desired state or behavior of the managed system is created and whenever the system deviates, corrective
actions are initiated to restore the system to the desired state or behavior. Model-based management is a
declarative approach to management, in that the desired system property is expressed but not the flow of
actions required to reach the property.
Model-based management is feasible for systems whose behavior can be easily expressed as models.
Behavior of complex systems, such as active spaces, with several dynamic and heterogeneous entities is hard
to describe using models. Policy-based management is a suitable approach in those circumstances since it
provides an imperative approach to specifying corrective actions in different situations.
Our research work combines some elements of model-based and policy-based management. We use
models to store configuration and persistent state information. This simplifies policy evaluation and enables
reasoning about rules with long-running actions.
12.5 Role-based Management
Role-based management has been introduced by Lupu et al. [Lup98] in the Ponder project. In their work,
roles are assigned to users and all entities belonging to a user should fulfill the associated obligations. This
approach is not suitable for pervasive systems with heterogeneous entities since different devices have different
capabilities. For example, if a user in a guest role has to authorize on entry into an active space, all devices
used by the user need to authenticate themselves. Some passive devices, such as location badges, may not
have the computing/communication capability necessary for authentication. Therefore, active space roles
should be based on entity and user types as we have presented in our work.
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Role-based access control (RBAC) [SCFY96] is used extensively in computer security to assign access
permissions to users using authorization policies. RBAC uses a notion of subjects, which are processes run-
ning on behalf of users [FCK95], and provides a one-to-many mapping from users to subjects. Permissions
assigned to users percolate to subjects. Role-based management (RBM) extends the role concept to obliga-
tion policies. We extend the models of RBAC to RBM in our work and define inheritance and constraints
for roles.
12.6 Active Database Rules
Active databases extensively use ECA-based frameworks for database triggers [DBB+88, BW00]. Database
triggers are actions that are fired in response to database events such as record insertions, deletions and
updations. Actions used in ECA frameworks are normally simple database operations whose effect on the
system is well-known. For example, an action that inserts a record in a database increases the number of
database rows by 1. When actions are simple and their effects are implicitly known, ECA-based frameworks
are sufficient.
ECA frameworks for management systems containing complex actions whose effects are not implicit. This
requires specifying the effects explicitly using some formal specification. Therefore, an ECPAP framework
is well-suited in such circumstances.
Baralis and Widom [BW00] have done extensive research on confluence and termination analysis of
database rules using ECA and condition-action (CA) rules. They have proposed properties to determine
confluent database actions. The scope of their work is limited to database rules and does not cover manage-
ment rules.
12.7 Other Projects
The Ponder project from Imperial College has contributed extensively to policy research . The project has
designed the Ponder language for policy specification [DDLS01], developed techniques for conflict analysis
[LS99], proposed role-based management techniques [Lup98] and ways for policy refinement using abduction
[BLMR04]. The problems addressed in their research differ considerably from that of ours. They do not
address conflicts due to action effects, do not offer techniques for cycle and enforcement order analysis, do
not support an exception model or support policies with long-running actions. Their work on role-based
management is also not directly applicable to pervasive systems.
Kagal et al. [KFJ03] have developed a language called Rei for specifying pervasive system policies. The
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focus of their work is on language design and conflict detection. They do not address many of the issues
such as enforcement ordering, long-running actions and exception handling as we have addressed.
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Chapter 13
Future Work
In this chapter, we discuss some future research directions of this work and suggest possible approaches.
Our initial results in some of the suggested directions have been encouraging. We do not describe the results
here as many issues are yet to be investigated in detail.
13.1 Policy Profiling and Debugging
Policy error detection and handling is a nascent topic and our exception model is one of the first efforts in
that direction. Our work focuses on runtime error detection and handling. It would be more desirable to
detect policy errors statically, at compile time where the policy designer can correct the errors. Similarly,
policies need to be profiled to determine various parameters such as rule evaluation time, dynamic analysis
overhead and other bottlenecks in policy enforcement.
The ECPAP framework can be used to develop profiling and debugging tools for policies. The action
specifications enable determining cascading rule enforcements and final system states after enforcement of a
set of rules. This can be possibly be used to determine policy errors and bottlenecks.
13.2 Policies with Composed Events
Our enforcement system accepts a set of events as a situation and evaluates the policy. The event correlation
system assumes a simple correlation model based on epochs [CLN00]. This model cannot sense all situations
and complex event correlation models should be developed based on event relations [OJC97, KYY+95] and
cause-effect graphs [Gru98]. The effect of these models on policy enforcement is an open research issue that
needs to be addressed.
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13.3 Policies and Models
The performance of the evaluation system can be improved if information about the configuration or state
of the system is known. For example, the current system queries individual nodes of a cluster to determine
their states while evaluating the pre- and post-condition expressions. This process is expensive requiring
multiple remote procedure calls to various nodes. If instead, the states of the entities can be cached in a
state model of the system, the model can be queried to evaluate the expressions. The model can be updated
independently. Similarly, if multiple entities trigger instances of the same rule on a change, information about
the configuration of the system can be effectively used to reduce the number of rules that are evaluated during
analysis. Therefore, policies and models can be effectively used to reduce the management response times
and communication overhead.
Currently, we use models to store the persistent system state. This can be extended to store the entire
system configuration and used during evaluation and analysis.
13.4 Incorrect Specifications
In this thesis, we assume that the action specifications are correct. This may not always be a reasonable
assumption to make. Incorrect specifications can greatly affect the performance of the system by wrongly
flagging conflicts, ordering action execution improperly and raising unwanted exceptions. Dealing with
incorrect specifications is an important research problem that is being addressed in model-checking, planning
and goal-based programming. Handling incorrect specifications is an open problem that should be addressed
in the ECPAP framework.
13.5 Behavioral Specifications
In this thesis, we have mainly focused on actions with axiomatic specifications. Most reasoning techniques
are applicable to actions with simple pre- and post-conditions. Actions with behavioral specifications were
introduced in chapter 7, where we showed how behavioral information expressed using temporal logic enables
reasoning about long-running actions. More complex reasoning can be performed and stronger guarantees
can be provided if detailed behavioral specifications are provided. Currently, we only support simple temporal
operators. Extending the specification with more temporal operators would enable better guarantees.
111
13.6 Policy Interpretation
Policy interpretation is the process of determining the goal a set of rules would achieve and is the inverse of
policy refinement. Interpretation is required to determine if a set of rules conforms to the stated guidelines
and would be more intuitive to an administrator who wants to know the result of enforcing the set of rules on
a system. Interpretation is an unaddressed problem in policy research and would be an interesting direction
to pursue.
13.7 Constraint Language for Role-based Management
In chapter 10, we presented a simplified version of RCL2000 for specifying constraints for roles. RCL2000 was
designed for RBAC systems and is not sufficiently powerful to specify constraint for role-based management
systems. A language is required to express constraints on entities, roles, rule templates and role hierarchies.
A formal constraint model should be developed to study the properties and power of the language.
13.8 Empirical Validation of Approaches
Our evaluations of the various algorithms and approaches have been mainly theoretical analyses of the
complexities and corresponding performance estimations. Our evaluations lack empirical justifications, which
is important before these techniques can be employed in practical settings. For example, our ordering
approach to rule enforcement is based on dependency analysis. Empirical investigations are required to
determine if the proposed maximum enforcement semantics is the desired semantics in a system. Similarly,
we propose an exception model that reconstructs the workflow on failure. Empirical validation is required
to verify if this approach is appropriate. Nevertheless, our framework and techniques provide a groundwork
for such validation and form an important initial step in that direction.
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Chapter 14
Conclusion
In this thesis, we presented a framework for specifying management policies for complex distributed systems
with particular emphasis on pervasive systems. We summarize the presented work and draw some final
conclusions in this chapter.
14.1 Summary
Pervasive computing opens up interesting opportunities by extending the physical environment with the
ability to access information and use computing resources anywhere and anytime. Electrical appliances and
consumer devices form components of a spatially distributed system and can be programmatically controlled
by users. The past few years have witnessed the development of many prototype pervasive systems and
several architectures, services and applications were created for different scenarios. The success of these
efforts has motivated the commercial deployment of these systems in homes, offices and other environments.
Deployment of these systems necessitates a management framework to enforce guidelines set by the
host organization. Policy-based management is an approach of enforcing such guidelines using reaction
rules. These rules specify the action to be executed in a given situation and are designed using the Event-
Condition-Action (ECA) framework. This framework expresses a situation as a combination of event and
condition and specifies the corrective action that should be executed when the event and condition are
observed. Existing policy-based systems are based on the ECA framework.
Typically, policies are designed for different components of a pervasive system by different administrators.
When they are combined by a policy enforcement system many issues may arise. Policy rules may conflict,
cause cycles, trigger in a random order, fail during enforcement and so on. Formal specifications of rule
actions are required to address these issues and so the ECA framework is poorly suited for designing policy
rules for pervasive systems.
In this thesis, we presented a specification-enhanced rule framework called Event-Condition-Precondition-
Action-Postcondition (ECPAP) for designing policy rules. This framework combines formal specifications
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of actions with rules. We demonstrated the ability of this framework for conflict analysis, cycle detection,
determining enforcement order when multiple rules are triggered and proposed an exception model for
policies. We showed how the ECPAP framework can be used for reasoning about rules with long-running
actions.
The ECA framework leads to non-deterministic policy enforcement. Determinism is essential for effective
policy-based management. In this thesis, we showed how the ECPAP framework enables deterministic policy-
based management and formally proved that the ECPAP rule enforcement, using the presented algorithms,
can be modeled as finite state machines.
The dynamism of active spaces complicates policy design as rules have to be updated when entities of
a space enter or exit the space. We extended the ECPAP framework with roles that makes policy design
simpler. Policies are designed for roles and a rule gets instantiated when an entity is added to a role.
We evaluated the various algorithms presented in this thesis theoretically and empirically. In addition,
we evaluated this framework on two other distributed systems and presented case studies. These evaluations
demonstrated the benefits and feasibility of the framework.
14.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a framework for developing management rules for complex distributed
systems. The specific contributions are :
• A framework for policy rule specification that incorporates formal specifications of actions.
• Techniques for conflict, cycle and rule ordering analysis.
• Exception model for policies.
• Support for policies with long-running actions.
• Role-based management approach for pervasive systems.
• Evaluation of the framework and case studies of its usage on two distributed systems.
In addition, we identified various research directions that can be pursued with the ECPAP framework and
suggested possible approaches, in this thesis.
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Appendix I
Policy Language Grammar
/*
∗ Policy grammar
∗
∗ Author: Chetan Shankar
∗/
options {
language=“java”;
}
//Parser grammar
class PolicyParser extends Parser;
options {
buildAST = true;
}
startPolicy: policyNameDecl startRule;
policyNameDecl: “PolicyName” ˆIDENT SEMI!;
startRule: (rule)* EOF!;
rule: “on” ˆLEFT PARAN! eventexpr RIGHT PARAN!
cond expr
“do” ˆLEFT PARAN! actionexpr RIGHT PARAN! SEMI! ;
cond expr: COND EXPR ˆ;
eventexpr: IDENT ˆ(LEFT PARAN! parameterDeclarationList RIGHT PARAN!)? ;
// A list of formal parameters
parameterDeclarationList
: (parameterDeclaration (COMMA ˆparameterDeclaration)* )?;
//A formal parameter
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parameterDeclaration
: IDENT ˆIDENT;
actionexpr
: dottedIdentifierList LEFT PARAN! paramList RIGHT PARAN!;
dottedIdentifierList
: IDENT (DOT ˆIDENT)*;
paramList
: (param (COMMA ˆparam)*)?;
param
: constant
| dottedIdentifierList;
constant
: STRING LITERAL
| CHAR LITERAL
class PolicyLexer extends Lexer;
options {
k = 4; //four characters of lookahead
}
IDENT: (’a’..’z’ | ’A’..’Z’ | ’ ’ | ’0’..’9’)+;
SEMI: ’;’;
LEFT PARAN: ’(’;
RIGHT PARAN: ’)’;
LEFT BRACE: ’{’;
RIGHT BRACE: ’}’;
COMMA: ’,’;
DOT: ’.’;
// Whitespace ignored
WS : ( ‘ ’
| ‘\ t’
| ‘\ f’
// handle newlines
| ( options {generateAmbigWarnings=false;}
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: “\ r \ n”
| ‘\ r’ // Macintosh
| ‘\ n’ // Unix (the right way)
)
{ newline(); }
)+
{ $setType(ANTLR USE NAMESPACE(antlr)Token::SKIP); };
// Single-line comments
SL COMMENT
: “//”
( (‘\ n’ | ‘\ r’))* (‘\ n’ | ‘\ r’(‘\ n’)?)?
{$setType(ANTLR USE NAMESPACE(antlr)Token::SKIP);} ;
// multiple-line comments
ML COMMENT
: “/*”
( { LA(2)!=‘/’ }? ‘*’ | ‘\ n’ { newline(); } | (‘*’ | ‘\ n’))*
“*/”
{ $setType(antlr::Token::SKIP); };
COND EXPR
: “if(”
(
options {
generateAmbigWarnings=false;
}
:
‘\ r’ ‘\ n’ {newline();}
| ‘\ r’ {newline();}
| ‘\ n’ {newline();}
| (‘\ n’ | ‘\ r’ | ‘)’)
)*
“)”;
// character literals
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CHAR LITERAL
: ‘\’ ’ ( ESC | ˜(‘\” | ’\ n’ | ’\ r’ | ’\\ ’) ) ’\ ”;
// string literals
STRING LITERAL
: ‘”’ (ESC | ˜(‘”’ | ‘\\’ | ‘\ n’ | ‘\ r’))* ‘”’;
protected
ESC
: ‘\\ ’
( ‘n’ | ‘r’ |‘t’ |‘b’ |‘f’ | ‘"’ | ‘\'’ | ‘\\ ’
| (‘u’)+ HEX DIGIT HEX DIGIT HEX DIGIT HEX DIGIT
| ‘0’..’3’
(
options {
warnWhenFollowAmbig = false;
}
: '0'.. '7'
(
options {
warnWhenFollowAmbig = false;
}
: '0'.. '7'
)?
)?
| ‘4’..‘7’
(
options {
warnWhenFollowAmbig = false;
}
: ‘0’..‘7’
)?
)
;
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protected
HEX DIGIT
: (‘0’..‘9’ | ‘A’..‘F’ | ‘a’..‘f’);
class PolicyTreeWalker extends TreeParser;
options {
k = 4;
}
policyname returns [ char *name]
{
}
: #(“PolicyName” pn:IDENT) {name = strdup(pn->getText().c str()); };
paramdecl returns [char *retPList]
{
}
: #(a:IDENT b:IDENT) {
int len1 = strlen(a->getText().c str());
int len2 = strlen(b->getText().c str());
retPList = (char*) malloc(len1 + 1 + len2); //1 - for the comma
strcpy(retPList, strdup(a->getText().c str()));
strcpy(retPList+len1,“ ”);
strcpy(retPList+len1+1, strdup(b->getText().c str()));
};
paramdeclexpr returns [char *retPList]
{
char *p, *prest;
}
: #(COMMA p=paramdecl prest=paramdeclexpr) {
int len1 = strlen(p);
int len2 = strlen(prest);
retPList = (char*) malloc(len1 + 1 + len2); //1 - for the comma
strcpy(retPList, p);
strcpy(retPList+len1, “,”);
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strcpy(retPList+len1+1, prest);
}
| (p=paramdecl) {retPList = strdup(p);};
eventexpr returns [ char *a]
{
char * pdecl;
}
: #(eventname:IDENT (pdecl=paramdeclexpr)*) {
int len1 = strlen(eventname->getText().c str());
int len2 = strlen(pdecl);
a = (char*) malloc(len1 + 2 + len2);
strcpy(a, strdup(eventname->getText().c str()));
strcpy(a+len1, “(”);
strcpy(a+len1+1, pdecl);
strcpy(a+len1+1+len2, “)”);
};
onexpr returns [ char *a]
{
char * estr;
}
: #(“on” estr=eventexpr ) {a = strdup(estr);};
ifexpr returns [ char *a]
{
char * x;
}
: #(“if” x=onexpr act:IDENT ) {a = strdup(act->getText().c str());};
ifonexpr returns [ char *a]
{
char * ifon;
}
: #(“if” ifon=onexpr IDENT ) {a = strdup(ifon); };
paramList returns [ char *retPList]
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{char *paramrest1, *paramrest2, *paramVal3;
}
: #(COMMA paramrest1=paramList paramrest2=paramList) {
int len1 = strlen(paramrest1);
int len2 = strlen(paramrest2);
retPList = (char*) malloc(len1 + 1 + len2); //1 - for the comma
strcpy(retPList, paramrest1);
strcpy(retPList+len1+1, “,”);
strcpy(retPList+len1+1, paramrest2);
}
| (paramVal1:STRING LITERAL) {retPList=strdup(paramVal1->getText().c str());}
| (paramVal2:CHAR LITERAL) {retPList=strdup(paramVal2->getText().c str());}
| (paramVal3=dottedIdentList) {retPList=strdup(paramVal3);};
dottedIdentList returns[ char *retDIL]
{
char * rest;
}
: #(DOT rest=dottedIdentList id:IDENT ) {
int len1 = strlen(rest);
char *tmp = strdup(id->getText().c str());
int len2 = strlen(tmp);
retDIL = (char *) malloc(len1 + 1 + len2);
strcpy (retDIL, rest);
strcpy(retDIL + len1, “.”);
strcpy(retDIL + len1 + 1, tmp);
}
| (idl1:IDENT) {retDIL= strdup(idl1->getText().c str());};
params returns [ char *a]
{
char * x, *act, *params;
}
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: #(“do” x=newCondExpr act=dottedIdentList (params=paramList)?) {a = strdup(params); };
action returns [ char *a]
{
char * x, *act,*p;
}
: #(“do” x=newCondExpr act=dottedIdentList (p=paramList)?) {a = strdup(act); };
cond returns [ char *a]
{
char * condval,*d,*p;
}
: #(“do” condval=newCondExpr d=dottedIdentList (p=paramList)?) { a = strdup(condval);};
event returns [ char *a]
{
char * onval,*d,*p;
}
: #(“do” onval=onexpr d=dottedIdentList (p=paramList)?) {a = strdup(onval); };
//====== new rules for modified grammar - treating if statement as a string
newCondExpr returns [char *a]
{
char * estr;
}
: #(“on” estr=eventexpr x:COND EXPR) {a=strdup(x->getText().c str());};
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